

bloc, that the bill as thus amended be considered as original text, and that no points of order be considered as waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

On page 2, line 10, after the word "elsewhere," to strike out "\$4,095,100,000" and insert "\$4,092,291,000"; in line 14, after the word "fund", to strike out "Provided, That not to exceed \$337,000,000 of the foregoing amounts shall be available for permanent change of station travel"; and in line 16, after the word "Provided", to strike out "further".

On page 3, line 6, after the word "fund", to strike out the colon and "Provided, That not to exceed \$169,600,000 of the foregoing amounts shall be available for permanent change of station travel".

On page 3, line 20, after the word "fund", to strike out the colon and "Provided, That not to exceed \$44,300,000 of the foregoing amounts shall be available for permanent change of station travel".

On page 4, line 6, after the word "fund", to strike out "Provided, That not to exceed \$301,100,000 of the foregoing amounts shall be available for permanent change of station travel"; and in line 10, after the word "Provided", to strike out "further".

On page 4, line 24, after "\$236,600,000", to insert a colon and "Provided, That the Army Reserve shall be maintained at an average strength of not less than 270,000 during fiscal year 1966."

On page 6, line 9, after the word "law", to strike out "\$266,200,000" and insert "\$271,800,000"; and in line 12, after the word "Code", to insert a colon and "Provided further, That the Army National Guard shall be maintained at an average strength of not less than 360,000 during fiscal year 1966."

On page 6, line 9, after the word "Government", to strike out "\$3,475,200,000" and insert "\$3,483,600,000".

On page 13, at the beginning of line 7, to strike out "\$533,762,000" and insert "\$533,400,000".

On page 17, line 16, after the word "authorized", to strike out "\$1,205,600,000" and insert "\$1,204,600,000".

On page 19, line 17, after the word "plants", to strike out "\$1,120,000,000" and insert "\$1,149,900,000".

On page 25, line 10, after the word "transferred", to strike out "\$150,000,000" and insert "\$100,000,000".

On page 26, after line 5, to insert a new title, as follows:

"TITLE V—EMERGENCY FUND, SOUTHEAST ASIA
"Department of Defense

"Emergency Fund, Southeast Asia

"For transfer by the Secretary of Defense, upon determination by the President that such action is necessary in connection with military activities in southeast Asia, to any appropriation available to the Department of Defense for military functions, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes, and for the same time period as the appropriation to which transferred, \$1,700,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That transfers under this authority may be made and funds utilized without regard to the provisions of subsection (b) of section 412 of Public Law 86-149, as amended, 10 U.S.C. 4774(d), 10 U.S.C. 9774(d), section 355 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 255), and 41 U.S.C. 12."

At the top of page 27, to change the title number from "V" to "VI".

On page 27, at the beginning of line 6, to change the section number from "501" to "601".

On page 27, at the beginning of line 18, to change the section number from "502" to "602".

On page 27, at the beginning of line 20, to change the section number from "503" to "603".

On page 28, at the beginning of line 23, to change the section number from "504" to "604".

On page 29, at the beginning of line 6, to change the section number from "505" to "605".

On page 29, at the beginning of line 10, to change the section number from "506" to "606"; and on page 30, line 16, after the word "Code", to insert a semicolon and "(h)" for the purchase of milk for enlisted personnel of the Department of Defense heretofore made available pursuant to section 1446(a), title 7, United States Code."

On page 30, at the beginning of line 20, to change the section number from "507" to "607".

On page 31, at the beginning of line 19, to change the section number from "508" to "608".

On page 32, at the beginning of line 11, to change the section number from "509" to "609".

On page 33, at the beginning of line 7, to change the section number from "510" to "610".

On page 33, at the beginning of line 11, to change the section number from "511" to "611".

On page 34, at the beginning of line 7, to change the section number from "512" to "612".

At the top of page 35, to insert:

"(d) The Secretary of Defense shall immediately advise the Committee on Appropriations of the Congress of the exercise of any authority granted in this section, and shall report monthly on the estimated obligations incurred pursuant to subsection (b) and (c)."

On page 35, at the beginning of line 8, to change the section number from "513" to "613".

On page 36, at the beginning of line 12, to change the section number from "514" to "614".

On page 37, at the beginning of line 7, to change the section number from "515" to "615"; in line 10, after the word "effects", to insert in excess of eleven thousand pounds net", and in line 11, after the word "shipment", to strike out "having a net weight in excess of thirteen thousand pounds for officers in pay grades O-7 through O-10; of twelve thousand pounds for officers in pay grade O-6; and eleven thousand pounds for all others".

On page 37, at the beginning of line 18, to change the section number from "516" to "616".

On page 37, at the beginning of line 23, to change the section number from "517" to "617".

On page 36, at the beginning of line 6, to change the section number from "518" to "616".

On page 36, at the beginning of line 13, to change the section number from "519" to "619".

On page 39, at the beginning of line 10, to change the section number from "520" to "620".

On page 39, at the beginning of line 17, to change the section number from "521" to "621".

On page 39, at the beginning of line 24, to change the section number from "622" to "622".

On page 40, at the beginning of line 6, to change the section number from "523" to "623".

On page 41, at the beginning of line 9, to change the section number from "524" to "624".

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 9221) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is the pending matter before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. H.R. 9221, the military appropriation bill.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments to the bill be agreed to en

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On page 41, at the beginning of line 17, to change the section number from "525" to "625".

On page 41, at the beginning of line 22, to change the section number from "528" to "628".

On page 42, at the beginning of line 9, to change the section number from "527" to "627".

On page 42, at the beginning of line 14, to change the section number from "528" to "628".

On page 43, at the beginning of line 3, to change the section number from "529" to "629".

On page 43, at the beginning of line 12, to change the section number from "530" to "630".

On page 43, at the beginning of line 23, to change the section number from "531" to "631".

On page 44, at the beginning of line 7, to change the section number from "532" to "632".

On page 44, at the beginning of line 13, to change the section number from "533" to "633".

On page 44, at the beginning of line 23, to change the section number from "534" to "634".

On page 45, at the beginning of line 13, to change the section number from "535" to "635".

On page 45, at the beginning of line 22, to change the section number from "536" to "636".

On page 46, at the beginning of line 11, to change the section number from "537" to "637".

On page 46, after line 18, to strike out:

"Sec. 538. None of the funds provided herein shall be used to pay any recipient of a grant for the conduct of a research project an amount equal to as much as the entire cost of such project."

And, in lieu thereof, to insert:

"Sec. 638. None of the funds provided herein shall be used to pay any recipient of a grant for the conduct of a research project an amount for indirect expenses in connection with such project in excess of 20 per centum of the direct costs."

On page 47, after line 2, to insert a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 639. Of the funds made available in this Act for repair, alteration, and conversion of naval vessels, at least 35 per centum shall be available for such repair, alteration, and conversion in privately owned shipyards: Provided, That if determined by the Secretary of Defense to be inconsistent with the public interest based on urgency of requirement of the fleet to have such vessels repaired, altered, or converted as required above, such work may be done in Navy or private shipyards as he may direct."

On page 47, after line 11, to insert a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 640. Only upon the approval by the Congress, through the enactment of law hereafter, of a realignment or reorganization of the Army Reserve Components, the Secretary may transfer the balances of appropriations made in this Act for the support of the Army Reserve Components to the extent necessary to implement such a realignment or reorganization; and the provisions in this Act establishing average strengths for the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard shall cease to be effective."

At the top of page 48, to insert a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 641. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for the expenses of the Special Training Enlistment Program (STEP) or similar programs."

On page 48, at the beginning of line 4, to change the section number from "539" to "642".

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as the manager of the bill on the floor, I propose to make a brief summary of the major points, and then ask that I may yield to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], unless at that time he desires to proceed otherwise.

SUMMARY OF THE BILL

Mr. President, the Department of Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1966 includes funds for the various programs and activities of the Department of Defense exclusive of the regular military construction program which was

considered in this body on last Friday, the military assistance program, and the civil defense program.

The budget requests for the programs and activities requiring new obligatory authority included in this bill total \$46,852,100,000, including the supplemental request of \$1,700 million for the southeast Asia emergency fund requested in Senate Document No. 45.

These requests for \$46.8 billion in new obligatory authority represent 43.3 percent of the \$108.1 billion new obligatory authority requested to date for all departments and agencies of the Federal Government for fiscal year 1966.

This bill as it passed the House of Representatives included \$45,067,500,000 in new obligatory authority. However, the House did not consider the supplemental request of \$1.7 billion for the southeast Asia emergency fund.

The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommends appropriations totaling \$46,756,319,000 of new obligatory authority, which includes the full \$1.7 billion supplemental request for the southeast Asia emergency fund.

These recommendations are:

Under appropriations for fiscal year 1965 by \$926,126,000;

Under the budget estimates for fiscal year 1966 by \$95,781,000; and

Over the House bill by \$1,638,819,000. However, excluding the \$1.7 billion for the southeast Asia emergency fund, which the House did not consider, the recommendations of the subcommittee are \$11,181,000 below the House bill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD at this point a tabulation giving a summary of the committee's recommendations by bill titles and organizational components.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Summary of appropriations

Title	Appropriations, fiscal 1965	Budget estimates, 1966	House allowance	Amount recommended by Senate committee	Increase (+) or decrease (-), Senate bill compared with--		
					Appropriations, 1965	Budget estimates, 1966	House allowance
Title I—Military Personnel	\$14,600,000,000	\$14,500,000,000	\$14,500,000,000	\$14,600,201,000	-\$65,700,000	+\$40,201,000	+\$1,701,000
Reappropriation		(58,100,000)	(58,100,000)	(58,100,000)	(+58,100,000)	-	-
Title II—Operation and Maintenance	12,445,878,000	12,471,600,000	12,454,500,000	12,402,628,000	+40,750,000	+21,025,000	+8,128,000
Reappropriation		(8,000,000)	(8,000,000)	(8,000,000)	(+8,000,000)	-	-
Contract authority liquidation		(64,044,000)	(64,044,000)	(64,044,000)	(+54,044,000)	-	-
Title III—Procurement	13,422,047,000	11,411,700,000	11,300,000,000	11,418,000,000	-2,093,147,000	+7,200,000	+28,900,000
Title IV—Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation	6,448,820,000	6,708,800,000	6,594,500,000	6,544,600,000	+55,980,000	-164,300,000	-50,000,000
Title V—Emergency Fund, Southeast Asia	700,000,000	1,700,000,000	1,700,000,000	1,700,000,000	+1,000,000,000	-	+1,700,000,000
Total	47,082,445,000	46,862,100,000	45,007,500,000	46,756,319,000	-226,120,000	-95,781,000	+1,638,819,000
Reappropriations and contract authority liquidation		120,744,000	120,744,000	120,744,000	+120,744,000	-	-
Adjusted total	47,082,445,000	46,862,844,000	45,188,244,000	46,877,063,000	-805,382,000	-95,781,000	+1,638,819,000
Distribution of appropriations by organizational component:							
Army	11,412,050,000	10,805,050,000	10,807,550,000	10,000,750,000	-505,900,000	+11,601,000	+9,101,000
Reappropriations		(12,300,000)	(12,300,000)	(12,300,000)	(+12,300,000)	-	-
Liquidation of contract authorization		(54,044,000)	(54,044,000)	(54,044,000)	(+54,044,000)	-	-
Navy	14,326,271,000	13,924,000,000	13,933,600,000	13,933,500,000	-362,771,000	+30,500,000	+29,900,000
Reappropriation		(8,650,000)	(8,650,000)	(8,650,000)	(+8,650,000)	-	-
Reappropriation		(45,800,000)	(45,800,000)	(45,800,000)	(+45,800,000)	-	-
Defense Agencies/OSD	2,634,614,000	2,770,741,000	2,702,641,000	2,712,260,000	+77,355,000	-64,472,000	-50,272,000
Southeast Asia Emergency Fund	700,000,000	1,700,000,000	1,700,000,000	1,700,000,000	+1,000,000,000	-	+1,700,000,000
Total, Department of Defense	47,082,445,000	46,862,100,000	45,007,500,000	46,756,319,000	-226,120,000	-95,781,000	+1,638,819,000
Reappropriations and liquidation of contract authority		120,744,000	120,744,000	120,744,000	+120,744,000	-	-
Adjusted total, Department of Defense	47,082,445,000	46,862,844,000	45,188,244,000	46,877,063,000	-805,382,000	-95,781,000	+1,638,819,000

¹ Submitted in 8. Doc. 45. Not considered by House.

Mr. STENNIS. The amounts budgeted for fiscal year 1966 will provide a total military strength of 2,640,226, excluding the recently announced increase of 340,000. Of this number, 953,094 will be members of the Army, which budgeted for 16 divisions, 4 armored cavalry regiments, and 7 brigades. The Army will have an active aircraft inventory of 7,624 planes.

For the Navy, the budget called for 684,848 active duty military personnel. The Navy plans to have approximately 900 commissioned ships in the fleet, comprised of 28 carrier air groups, 32 patrol and warning squadrons, and an active aircraft inventory, including the Marines, of 8,241.

For the Marine Corps, there is planned in the budget a total of 193,190 active duty military personnel, including 3 Marine divisions and 3 air wings.

For the Air Force, the budget called for 809,134 active duty military personnel. These personnel would man 74 combat wings, including missile wings, and 112 combat support flying squadrons. There was budgeted an active aircraft inventory of 13,706 planes for the Air Force.

I now refer especially to what we call in this bill the \$1.7 billion Southeast Asia Emergency Fund. This item was submitted by the President in a supplemental request after the bill had already passed the House.

In discussing the items that are included in that bill, I believe I can make it clearer by first outlining the items the \$1.7 billion does not include.

The first item that is not covered by the \$1.7 billion is those funds to provide for the 340,000 additional military personnel which it is now planned to add to our present military strength. The expense of bringing those men into the service and taking care of that expense will be paid for through section 612(c) of the bill now before us. Section 612 is to a degree a transcription of the provision first included in the bill at the time of the Berlin buildup several years ago.

It has been included as an emergency authority in every appropriation bill since then, but it has not been since fiscal year 1962. Its present utilization will provide for the expenses of bringing in the additional men. A direct appropriation will have to be made for it some time later.

This expense will start now and will continue until the 340,000 men are added, which will be approximately a year from now, or September 1966. Therefore, the expense will be at a mounting rate. On the average, the personnel costs will be approximately at the rate of \$5,000 per man on a 12-month basis. The money will be appropriated in a supplemental bill.

For the Army, an increase of 235,000 military personnel is contemplated, including one new division, three brigades, aviation companies, and combat support forces. For the Navy, an increase of 35,000 is contemplated, certain ships will be retained in the active fleet, other ships will be activated, and manning

levels will be increased for deployed ships and bases in southeast Asia. For the Marine Corps, the three division and aircraft wings will be augmented by 30,000 personnel. For the Air Force, the B-52 bomber, the tactical fighter, and the troop carrier squadrons will be augmented; a reconnaissance squadron scheduled to be phased out will be retained; and airlift utilization capability will be increased. In addition, increased readiness is planned for the Reserve components, with the size of the Army Reserve increase still to be determined.

I mention this now because everyone has the right to know exactly what the complete picture is, and what the Appropriations Committee is doing about it.

Therefore, in effect, we are approving the idea of financing the cost of these added men in this way.

I wish to point out two other items which are not financed in this measure. First, it does not contain any funds for the pending pay increase for military personnel, which will be funded from the amounts available until after the start of the next calendar year. Second, it does not contain the full funding required for the vigorous prosecution of the war in Vietnam. The \$700 million supplemental passed last May merely enabled the Department to balance the books for fiscal year 1965. The \$1.7 billion amendment to this present bill will ease the financial drain in certain procurement and military construction programs, but it is not intended to finance the actual combat operations.

Much of this expense is found in what we call the personnel and operation and maintenance cost—that is, O. & M.—of operation of the services. Under the item of "personnel" are included the salaries and traveling expenses of men and the subsistence of enlisted personnel. The operation and maintenance item includes almost everything else in the way of general expense, the actual operation of the Department. The operations associated with combat in southeast Asia are not included in this \$1.7 billion.

Again, the extra cost which goes with that war will be financed temporarily through section 612(a), which permits the President to spend money that is appropriated for the general program, and to spend it in advance rather than on a quarterly basis, to anticipate from one quarter to another, and spend more than one quarter of it, say, in the first quarter.

That method is not unusual or extraordinary, and will eventually be taken care of in a supplemental bill.

Furthermore, the \$1.7 billion does not include all the procurement dollars now contemplated as needed for this war at its present rate of operation. No one knows how much that figure will develop into. We do not know how many airplanes we may lose. We do not know to what extent the war will be carried on, what the tempo will be, or at what level. However, we do know enough about it to know that the \$1.7 billion will not be enough to cover the extra costs of that war for the rest of this fiscal year.

There are no funds in the bill, either, for shortages of equipment which may be found in any of our other divisions. Nor is there any new money in the bill to cover the creation of any new division which will be included in the 340,000 additional troops I have already mentioned. Out of that will come at least one new division for the Army.

On the affirmative side, the \$1.7 billion for the southeast Asia emergency fund will provide the funds that are needed immediately for the procurement of such expendable items as bombs, rockets, conventional ammunition, and small weapons. It includes funds for advanced procurement necessary to support an increase in the production of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters of the types that are being used in southeast Asia. Substantial funds are included for the procurement of spare and repair parts to support the operations of aircraft and other weapons being used there. Funds are also included for the construction of a limited number of high priority facilities most of which are located in southeast Asia.

We have an itemized list of the items supplied by the Department of Defense in our files. Much of it is classified, of course, and we cannot place it in the RECORD, but it is available for any Senator to examine.

So far as security will permit, we shall be glad to answer any questions later that any Senator wishes to ask. Any answers that we cannot give in open debate we will supply to any Senator who is interested before he casts his vote.

I should like to add a few words at this point, which represent more or less my own ideas, with reference to the picture in south Asia and the need for the funds and equipment which go with it, and other related needs.

While the situation in Vietnam and the mounting tempo of our operations there are foremost in the minds of all of us, it is well to bear in mind that this bill provides funds for our military forces worldwide. The amount recommended is the minimum amount required to insure that we maintain a superior defense posture and are provided with the military assets and resources which are vital to insuring the safety and integrity of this Nation now and in the future. As I have already indicated, it is my judgment that it will be adequate for that purpose only with the addition of substantial amounts early next year.

It must be recognized that, unless the situation changes suddenly and drastically, next January will find us faced with a substantially larger request for supplemental funding. This will be required to replace personnel and operations and maintenance funds expended from the regular appropriation, to procure additional equipment, weapons and war consumables both for Vietnam and for our other forces around the world, and to fund the military pay increase.

Furthermore, sooner or later we are going to have to provide the funds to replace equipment and materiel diverted to Vietnam, to reconstitute our strategic reserve, to supply existing shortages of

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equipment and weapons, and to forestall even more serious problems and deficiencies. I do not propose to discuss this in detail at this time but I am convinced that there are substantial problems in this area which, if neglected, could become critical. I do not believe that they are critical at the present time. They will not be overcome merely by denying that they exist.

Vietnam Our First Line of Defense

Mr. President, with respect to the situation in Vietnam, this is a matter which has concerned me greatly, particularly during this calendar year. The battle-lines there have now become the very first line of defense for our Nation. I do not have too much patience with the argument as to how we got there. I was interested in that argument a year ago. Frankly, I did not favor our going in there, but I have no patience with that argument now, since we are committed, and our boys are fighting and dying there every day and night. Our fighting men there are locked in a battle for our own freedom, security, and safety. This is an important and vital fact. It should always be remembered. Our people should be reminded of it more frequently.

I do not wish to be understood as saying that we alone can protect and defend all of non-Communist Asia, or even all of non-Communist southeast Asia against Asian Communist aggression.

I do not believe this can be done without substantial assistance in men, money, and materiel from the other free world nations. There is a crucial need for a strong common effort by nations which have a common interest in the cause of freedom.

However, we have now selected Vietnam where we will make a stand. As matters have developed over the years, there is now no realistic alternative to standing firm and providing our fighting men with all the arms and equipment they need. Our flag and our men are on the battlefield there, and we are deeply and heavily committed. We must stay with our men in uniform and support them in every respect. We must support them not only in money and materiel, but also with moral support and unity among ourselves, as their representatives and the representatives of the people from which they come.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield. First, however, let me add this thought. The Senator from Massachusetts and I have attended a great many hearings in the course of the year. We know the dark side of the picture. We have had a chance to know about it as well as most persons in Washington, though not all, and I have been frankly discouraged about it—not hopeless, but discouraged. I believe that last week, a turn in the most recent battle in Vietnam has meant even more than its immediate content. I believe that we are getting our feet on the ground, so to speak. Our men are getting a grip on things, and are understanding the situation much better as to what the nature of the warfare there is and what they are up against. I

still believe there is a long, bloody road ahead, but I am encouraged to believe that we have made a step forward.

I am glad to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator. I wished to state, in furtherance of what the Senator has said on this question, that if we do not stand firm, and if we do not support our men morally and physically and with equipment, we shall have to support more men with more equipment in some other place in the world. We must show that we can stand firm and that we will stand firm in Vietnam.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has stated it very well. I am certainly not happy about having to do this. However, we are there. If we run out or back out or are pushed out, we shall only be borrowing trouble for which we will have to pay with compound interest in other places in the world in the future, and perhaps not too far in the future.

The one honorable alternative available to us under the present circumstances is to stand our ground unflinchingly.

Tragically, this means sending our boys to fight and die in mountain highlands and steaming jungles. It also means that we must bear the burden of higher and higher costs and greater and greater appropriations.

Our fighting men in Vietnam deserve the gratitude and tribute of all Americans and freedom-loving people everywhere. They fight for the cause of freedom.

I have no illusions. I have tried to be realistic. As I said some moments ago, when we first went in, my advice was to the contrary. However, we chose to make a stand there and to fight. Our men are highly skilled, highly trained, and possess excellent morale.

The fine morale of our boys is the brightest thing in the clouds over there that we have seen all year. Our enlisted men, some of them merely boys, the older, more mature enlisted men, the young officers, the middle-aged officers, and the senior officers all have this fine morale. I have been deeply impressed with the uniformly high morale that the reports show. Once again they are proving that the American soldier is a magnificent fighting man who is completely dedicated to the security and survival of his country. Upon us, and upon Americans in all walks of life, there devolves the responsibility to support them in every respect and to endure any sacrifice which is necessary to ensure that they do not lack for any equipment, weapons or material necessary to enable them to do their job with maximum efficiency.

I say this with emphasis. This not only means fighting materiel and equipment and uniforms, but also morale at home and unity at home, and the avoidance of small issues.

Every Member of this body has the greatest freedom to argue for what he believes are the merits of various problems or issues. I hope this will always be a free forum. However, so far as supporting our men out there is concerned

and standing behind them and not entertaining any idea of running out or being pushed out, I hope there will be no argument about those things. We must stand and stand as one.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. I am sure that all of us join the Senator in the sentiments he has expressed about the fighting quality and the morale of our armed services.

I direct my questions to the adequacy of supplies for those who are fighting in Vietnam. I have heard the Senator comment on this subject on several occasions, and he has always been forthright. He said months ago that we were at war. In his television appearance 2 weeks ago on "Meet the Press," he was very forthright and candid in his discussion of the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. COOPER. Charges have been made to the effect that there are shortages of equipment and supplies for our men in Vietnam. Does he intend to speak about the charge during this debate?

Mr. STENNIS. If I may answer the Senator, I have spoken before about shortages—not critical shortages, in our other divisions, back home, with reference to spare parts, and items of that kind. The Senator from Mississippi has always emphasized that the shortages do not apply to our men in Vietnam. I do not believe there are any shortages there, or have been, of any equipment or supplies, or of food or medical supplies or ammunition or planes. Everything needed by our fighting men is supplied. Under certain circumstances, in a particular location, perhaps for a few hours or perhaps a day or two, when the men had been cut off, supplies may not have been exactly where they were needed, but generally our men are well supplied and have been. I do not see any prospect of anything like that happening. Our concern has been with respect to the drain that the war has been on our other divisions. Now it is being taken care in part by the \$1.7 billion appropriation. The situation has been improved during the past 2 months.

Mr. COOPER. I am glad to hear the Senator's comment on this most important question that there is no shortage of supplies for the members of our armed services in Vietnam.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. I do not think there is any doubt about that.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator has mentioned the drain on the aggregate of our military supplies. Is the situation such that there is danger that there will be shortages of supplies during the rest of the year or in the next year?

Mr. STENNIS. No. Most fortunately, the shortcomings that we have can be overcome with the enormous capacity that we have for the production of these very items. I believe that the fill-in will be available when needed. The situation was developing to a point where it could have become critical. However, I have always said that there was no critical shortage.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator has said the \$1.7 billion additional appropriation will help maintain the supplies that are needed. Is it sufficient?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I pointed out certain items that are not included, and it will require more in January or February.

But, of course, \$1.7 billion will be a great help. The Committee on Appropriations urges that the same requests be made for those funds. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I wish to add that we have evidence from the military men themselves and from the civilians in charge of the Military Establishment that there are no present shortages, and apparently there will be none, in Vietnam. Our problem is to make sure, not only that the military there are well supplied, but that supplies and the equipment are not drained from our other divisions, and that our other divisions are kept in a proper state and quality of readiness, while they may lack at the present time because of the amount of equipment that is going to Vietnam. But there is no present shortage in Vietnam, and I believe there will be none if the Senate passes this bill and takes care of the supplemental appropriation in January.

Mr. COOPER. I hope the Senator is correct. I remember that, despite the great commitment in Korea, there were continual charges of shortages; and after the war was over, an investigation was held by a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee on which I served. He will remember that it disclosed that there had been critical shortages in Korea. General Van Fleet and others testified that there had been shortages which had adversely affected our military action in Korea.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is entirely correct; and we are trying to avoid that situation now. We appreciate the Senator's support.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts for such time as he may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator from Mississippi. I should like to add a few more thoughts to the statement he has just made. As I have said, the Senator from Mississippi is one of the most conscientious and hard-working Senators, and has given greatly of his time and abilities to reporting what I believe is a proper bill for maintaining our Defense Department.

As he has said, the committee has taken care of the immediate needs in Vietnam by this \$1.7 billion appropriation, and we must expect a substantial supplemental appropriation in January, not only to cover our needs in Vietnam and the needs of our military everywhere, but also to take care of the increased pay bill, which in itself will cost a billion dollars a year.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for his remarks and for the time, attention, counsel, and judgment that he has so generously given the committee all these months. Hearings on this bill began some time in early February, and have continued at intervals until just a few days ago. The Senator from Massachusetts has been present without fail, and has rendered valuable, outstanding service, based upon his years of experience as well as his dedication in this and every other field.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I appreciate what the Senator has said. It is always easy and agreeable to cooperate with him.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, the committee considered programs totaling nearly \$50 billion, including \$1.7 billion for the southeast Asia emergency fund which was submitted after the House had acted on this appropriation measure. As I have stated, the funds provided for in this bill will meet the needs of the military and the Department of Defense, exclusive of military assistance, military construction and Civil Defense, which will be considered in other appropriations bills. Included in this total are approximately \$47 billion for programs which are to be financed from budget estimates for new obligational authority and \$3 billion anticipated to be available from sources other than new obligational authority. That is, transfers from working capital funds, unobligated balances available from prior years, recoupments from prior year programs, and funds derived from sale of military equipment. In addition, the committee considered requests for reappropriations and funds for liquidation of contract authority in the amount of more than \$120 million for the three services.

The appropriations recommended by our committee are more than \$95 million below the budget request for new obligational authority and more than \$1.6 billion net over the House allowance, of which \$1.7 billion is for the new southeast Asia emergency fund. When this amount is excluded the recommendations of our committee are more than \$11 million below the total appropriations provided in the House bill.

I will only mention a few of the items considered by our committee; namely, the elimination of the restrictions placed by the House on the permanent change of station travel for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force. That obviously is necessary because of the Vietnam crisis. Our committee considered the proposal to establish a special training enlisted program—STEP—and the committee denied the request for the initiation of the STEP program. The committee took the position that this was not a proper program to be administered by the Army.

Mr. President, I agree with the action of the committee, because this training enlisted program, without going into details about it, is the responsibility of other departments of the Government, and I do not believe the Army ought to get into programs that involve the social,

educational, and economic advancement of those persons who have been found ineligible for military service for one reason or another.

The committee did not take a position with respect to the realignment of the National Guard and Army Reserve components. It felt that separate legislation should be enacted in order to bring this about. The committee appropriated the fund for the National Guard and Army Reserve components on the same basis as heretofore. It recommended a provision in the bill to implement through the appropriations any reorganization that is approved by Congress through the enactment of law.

We have included a provision that if a new law is passed and approved by the President, these funds can be transferred to carry out the requirements of the new law. But essentially, this bill provides for the National Guard and the Army Reserve in the way that they have heretofore been provided for.

The committee provided \$100 million, \$50 million below the budget request, for the emergency fund for the transfer by the Secretary of Defense with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget, to any appropriations for military functions available for research, development, test and evaluation or procurement or production related thereto and in addition \$150 million to be used by the Secretary of Defense upon determination that such funds can be wisely, profitably and practically used in the interest of national defense. These funds will be derived by transfer from appropriations available for obligation during the current fiscal year. These transfers shall not exceed 7 percent of the appropriation from which transferred. In addition there is \$200 million available to transfer from any military appropriation for the purpose of improving the readiness of the Armed Forces should the emergency needs of the military require it.

The Secretary of Defense has almost \$300 million for transfer for research purposes to improve and modernize our equipment, and another \$200 million available for transfer for any immediate needs of the armed services. The committee believes this amount has been sufficient in the past and is sufficient for the present.

I should point out that this bill does not include funds for personnel costs resulting from (a) the acceleration of combat activities in southeast Asia, (b) the announced increase of 340,000 men in the active forces, and increases in the reserved forces, (c) the military pay raise. The above costs will be met under the authorities in section 612 of the bill and will be the subject of a supplemental request transmitted to the Congress at a later date.

The committee recommended the deletion of section 538 of the House bill dealing with indirect costs of research grants and the insertion of language that has appeared in the bill in past years.

The committee has recommended an allowance of 20 percent for administrative costs in research work and that will

The committee recommended the inclusion of the limitation on ship repairs, alteration and conversion providing that 65 percent of such work shall be performed in Government shipyards and 35 percent in private yards. The Navy has indicated that they can live with this provision although the Budget recommended its deletion.

Those are the same percentages that have been included in the bill for the past several years. The Navy does not like it particularly, but they say they can work under it, so it has been included, and there again, it will go to conference, because the House struck out this provision in its bill.

I should remind the Senate that the \$1.7 billion emergency fund for southeast Asia will temporarily provide the necessary funds required. In January, I predict we will be called upon to appropriate a substantial amount to provide guns, trucks, helicopters, and so forth, that will be needed.

On the whole I think that this bill will, for the time being, adequately provide for the needs of the military services. The necessary balance will come from a supplemental request next year.

I heartily join the Senator from Mississippi in believing we have provided for the needs of our Armed Forces and those who are fighting in Vietnam, and the forces that are equipped in Europe, in this country, and in other places around the rest of the world, and I hope that this bill will have the unanimous support of the Members of the Senate.

I join the Senator from Mississippi in the feeling that, for the time being, we have provided for the needs of our Armed Forces—those which are fighting in Vietnam and those that we are equipping in Europe, in this country, and elsewhere throughout the world. I hope the bill will have the unanimous support of the Senate.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. Of course, we will support the bill by providing whatever sums are required. But is the Senator able to make any estimate now concerning the sum of additional appropriations that will be required by the first of the year?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Mississippi has left that question open, so to speak. However, it would not be improper to say that the supplemental bill which will come before Congress in January will have to provide between \$7 and \$10 billion, at least.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for his remarks. We shall both be glad to answer questions to the best of our ability.

There are certain other subjects that should be discussed a little more at length because of their general interest.

SENATE INSISTENCE ON PREPAREDNESS FINANCING

As a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I take what I believe to be justifiable pride in the fact that the committee and the Senate itself have, through the years, demonstrated on re-

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peated occasions our concern over the adequacy of our defense posture. On many occasions we have recommended the appropriation of additional funds when we have believed the budget requests to be inadequate.

To cite only one example from a large number of such actions, let me remind the Senate of what happened in 1940. Gen. George C. Marshall appeared before the committee to justify the Army's request for approximately \$860 million in appropriations for the coming fiscal year. The Nazis had meanwhile overrun Norway and Denmark and were about to launch attacks on Holland and Belgium. The committee recognized the inadequacy of the budget request, which had been prepared months before. Our revered chairman, Senator HAYDEN, who was a member of the committee at that time, took a leading part in urging the Department to make known its needs. He remarked, in words which we might well have used 25 years later:

Anyone who reads the hearings will note that the principal discussion is not what was in the bill, but what ought to be in the bill in order properly to meet the situation which confronts us. As a result of hearings more than 2 weeks ago, the committee stated to the representatives of the War Department that, while they might be bound by budget limitations, the committee was not, and the committee desired full information from them in detail as to what changes should be made in the bill in order to accomplish the desired purpose.

That committee asked General Marshall to go back to the War Department, study the adequacy of our defenses, and come back to the committee with a revised request. He did so, asking for funds which almost doubled the previous request. We had initiated the impetus toward preparedness.

History repeated itself again this year in connection with the war in Vietnam. Subsequent to the presentation of the budget document and House consideration of the bill, American involvement intensified in southeast Asia, necessitating the utilization of material and equipment earmarked for peacetime uses elsewhere. To me, and to some of our colleagues, it became obvious that it was imperative to add substantial funds to this bill if we were to be assured that our Military Establishment—apart of the war in Vietnam—were to be maintained on the level of readiness indicated as necessary in the budget request.

On June 9 the Secretary of Defense had written to the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee a letter which appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on June 23, the day the defense appropriations bill was being considered by the House. It is too lengthy to quote in full, but the gist of it appears in the final paragraph:

To summarize, the fiscal year 1966 defense budget request now before the Congress would provide all the funds we need at this time to continue the strengthening of our overall military posture and to carry out whatever combat operations our forces are overall military posture and to carryout months. The special transfer provisions contained in the bill and the reprogramming arrangements approved by the committee provide sufficient flexibility to meet all fore-

seeable requirements until the Congress reconvenes next January and can act on a possible fiscal year 1966 supplemental.

I, for one, strongly doubted the wisdom of this policy. On June 25, I appeared on this floor and spoke on the inadequacy of the requests which the Department of Defense had presented to the committee. At that time, I said:

Based upon a careful and extensive study and analysis over a period of several months, I am compelled to suggest to the Senate and the decisionmakers in the Pentagon that it is now time to reexamine the entire fiscal year 1966 defense budget for the purpose of insuring that funds will be available to meet our defense requirements, including our stepped-up activities in Vietnam.

Unless the budget is revised upward and additional procurement is instituted in the near future, critical problems could arise in combat essential firepower, mobility, and communications equipment.

I urge the Secretary of Defense to make an immediate study of the entire situation and come to the Congress with all the facts and with such revisions in the fiscal year budget as are necessary to take up the slack caused by the heavy unplanned and unprogrammed expenditures.

We resumed our hearings on July 14. On that day and on subsequent days, I repeatedly asked the responsible officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force as to the adequacy of their budget requests. In this I was joined by other members of the committee. At the time I stated that I thought it was a ridiculous situation listening to testimony supporting requests for purposes for which we knew the funds could not be used if the war in Vietnam continued.

At that time the Secretary of Defense was in Vietnam. Very shortly after his return a supplemental request for \$1.7 billion was submitted to the Senate. The total amount is included in the bill now under consideration. It is the hope of the committee that it will prove adequate to meet the most important requirements which could not otherwise be financed until Congress returns in January.

However, I would be less than frank if I left you with the impression that this sum will finance the war in the present fiscal year. It definitely will not. In this light, the Congress and the executive branch must realize that the war on poverty is not the only war which we are engaged in at this time. American boys are dying every day in Vietnam for American ideals that are as important to us as raising the standard of living in local communities. The Department of Defense has understandably been unable to estimate how much will be required for the rest of the year, but it will be substantially more than this supplemental, which includes only certain procurement funds and a little construction money. As I have previously stated, it does not include any funds for the increases in military personnel announced by the President.

I should like now to discuss the major changes which your committee has made in the House bill.

The proposal of the Department of Defense to merge the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard has received much attention from Congress during

the present session. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee and a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee have held extensive hearings on the proposal. The Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of both Houses have held hearings on the proposal.

The President's budget was based on the realignment, and provided funds for a year-end paid drill strength of 575,000 all in the Army National Guard.

It was made clear during the course of the hearings that substantive legislation would be required in order fully to achieve the goals of the Department's proposal. No such legislation has been reported, and it is highly improbable that such necessary legislation will be enacted during this session of Congress. That is the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi.

In view of the lack of legislation and the likely possibility that certain elements of the Army Reserve components might be called to active duty, it was the view of the committee that the Army Reserve forces should be maintained at their present strength of approximately 270,000 in the Army Reserve and 380,000 in the Army National Guard.

There has been what is called strength authorization of 300,000 in the Army Reserve and 400,000 in the Army National Guard, but the figures of 270,000 in the Army Reserve and 380,000 in the Army National Guard are approximately the present level of strength. Those figures were used as a floor, not a ceiling. To accomplish this, the committee recommends appropriations totaling \$960.5 million for the support of the Army Reserve components, which is an increase of \$83.3 million over the budget and \$25.4 million over the House allowances.

Furthermore, the committee has recommended the inclusion in the bill of provisions to require the Department to maintain the Army Reserve at an average strength of not less than 270,000 and the Army National Guard at an average strength of not less than 380,000.

In the event that Congress, through the enactment of law, approves a reorganization or realignment of the Army Reserve components, the committee has recommended the inclusion in the bill of a provision for the necessary authority to transfer funds to implement such a reorganization.

That question will be in conference on this bill. The Senator from Mississippi understands, but has not had it outlined to him—neither did the committee—that there will still be another request by the Department of Defense for some such treatment on this subject, particularly to enable the Department to bring up to full strength four of the National Guard divisions that are now at about 80 percent of strength.

I do not know what that plan is. I do not know whether the proposal will be limited to that group or just what it will be. But something may have to be provided in conference.

In view of the possible callup of those four divisions, or even more, or parts of the four divisions, an acute situation is presented, as Senators will readily see.

I have no plan in mind. I have nothing to suggest. I have no thought except what I have just expressed.

I invite the attention of the members of the subcommittee, especially the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], who is interested and has done some vital thinking concerning the possibility of such a request being made, particularly as to the four divisions. I mention this now because we shall be calling upon him for help.

The matter could become more acute at any time and could become greatly changed before Congress returns in January. I shall be glad to answer any questions later on this point, but those are the facts of the matter.

The situation has been nailed down for the time being, as I have already explained, by providing language that if some other plan is adopted, the Secretary would have the authority to transfer funds to carry out the plan.

It is possible that some other plan might be proposed which would appeal to the conferees; I do not know. I assure Senators that there is no disposition on my part or the part of other conferees to reach any kind of agreement without consultation.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. I hope the conference committee will not agree to any plan that would provide for the transfer of personnel and funds, because the Secretary of Defense would then be accomplishing in an indirect way or through the backdoor, so to speak, what he has failed to accomplish through the front-door. If funds and personnel are transferred, that is really all there is to it, in a way.

I hope that if this proposal is not agreeable to the Secretary of Defense, legislation will be proposed and considered on its own merits and not brought before us as a part of the conference report on this big defense appropriation bill, which is so important to the Nation.

I feel that legislation such as that pertaining to the Reserve-Guard question should be determined by the Senate on its own merits and not intermingled with the main bill.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his suggestions. The Senator from Mississippi would rather that this be done as a straight, orthodox legislative process. However, I must make the point that we cannot close our eyes to situations that may develop.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senator from South Carolina to the fact that section 640 of the bill provides that only upon the approval by the Congress, through the enactment of law hereafter, of a realignment or reorganization, can the balances be moved around.

I wanted to make it clear that a conference committee could not move them around without the enactment of a law.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I

thank the able Senator from Massachusetts. I should like to get an interpretation from the able Senator from Mississippi on that point.

I gained the impression that perhaps the Senator from Mississippi felt that if the conference committee should reach agreement on and bring in a certain provision, such procedure could be considered as an enactment by law.

I remember that I moved in the committee to amend section 640 to insert the words "only" before the words, "upon the approval by the Congress," and "hereafter" after the word "law." I was of the opinion that with those words contained in the bill, it would be clearly specified that there would have to be such legislation. I should like to have the benefit of the interpretation of the Senator on that provision. That was the purpose in adding those two words, as the Senator from Massachusetts has so cogently brought out.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall be glad to answer the Senator as fully as I can.

In the first place, let us take the negative side. I do not see how we could enact any language in the Senate that would be binding on the House. I do not see any way that the Senate conferees could guarantee that they would bring back only the language contained in the Senate bill on this subject and nothing else. Our system of legislation would not permit such action.

That is the reason that I emphasize that such a thing is possible. I do not want it to happen, but it is possible that the conferees could come forth with something different, and they would have the authority, subject to the approval of the Senate, to change this language, so that we could not make it finally binding here and now.

As the Senator from Mississippi understands the rules, when the measure would come back to the Senate, if there were language contained in the measure which was objectionable to the Senator from South Carolina or some other Senator, the Senator could, under our rules, obtain a separate vote on that particular point. I would certainly favor a separate vote on that point. So, in effect, it would mean that no language in a measure could be passed by the Senate without a separate vote on the particular language with reference to his subject matter.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for making that point. I believe it is an important point to be brought out at this time.

I believe that the able Senator would agree that if the language contained in the bill now could be retained, there would have to be separate legislation hereafter to provide anything different.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. THURMOND. The question is whether we can maintain that language in the bill.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I express the sincere hope that the able Senator from Mississippi will exert every

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possible effort to maintain the language placed in the bill by the Senate committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

I have had no plan presented to me in any way that appeals to me more than the language contained in the bill. However, I recognize that the problem of bringing up those four divisions is on our doorstep, and that perhaps it cannot be deferred altogether until January. I am sure that we see that as a problem which is facing us.

ARMY SPECIAL TRAINING ENLISTMENT PROGRAM

Returning to my remarks, another item of general interest is the Army's Special Training Enlistment program, commonly referred to as the STEP program. For fiscal year 1966 \$31.2 million was requested. Under this proposed program medical care and educational training would be given by the Army to a limited number of individuals who do not presently meet Army's medical and mental standards. It will be recalled that the Office of Economic Opportunity through its Job Corps has a somewhat similar program. The Department of Defense sought the authority to proceed with this program last spring through a reprogramming request. This request was rejected by the Department of Defense Subcommittee after a hearing and thorough consideration. However, the subcommittee did indicate its willingness to again consider the program in connection with this bill. Again the committee recommends that this program be rejected. The nature of the program is such that it is the view of the committee that the Army is not the proper agency of the Government to administer it. Furthermore, and more important, is the fact that the recently announced increase of 235,000 in the strength of the Army will impose a tremendous burden on the existing basic and advanced training facilities. For example, the STEP program would utilize almost 100 percent of the training capacity of Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., which is one of the Army's most modern training facilities.

An amendment will be offered to restore this provision to the bill. I believe that the discussion of that matter can come at that time.

NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

There are two items included in the Navy's shipbuilding program which I should call to the attention of the Senate. The first is an increase of \$133.6 million for the construction of two additional nuclear powered attack submarines. The budget included funds for only four, even though the Department had advised the Congress that the rate of production would continue at six for several years. Let me add that the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended the funding of six attack submarines during fiscal 1966. During the hearings it was clearly established that the submarine threat to American control of the seas had not lessened. In view of this fact it was the opinion of the committee that we should continue the construction of six nuclear attack sub-

marines a year. This action is in accord with the authorization act.

The other item is the \$20 million included in the bill for the long-lead time procurement for a nuclear powered guided missile frigate. While the budget does not include any funds for this ship, the authorization act did include \$150.5 million. The committee believes that the Navy should proceed with the construction of more nuclear-powered surface ships. It has therefore included the \$20 million for advanced procurement and has urged the Department to include funds for construction of this ship in the fiscal year 1967 budget.

EMERGENCY FUND

The bill has for many years carried an appropriation designated as an emergency fund, which permits the Department of Defense to transfer cash appropriations and other funds to support the exploitation of new scientific developments and technological breakthroughs in the various research, development, test, and evaluation accounts. The Department requested for fiscal year 1966 \$150 million in appropriations and a like amount in transfer authority. The committee has provided \$100 million in appropriations and the budgeted transfer authority of \$150 million. It did so after it received evidence that substantial sums in the appropriation were being transferred during the last month of the fiscal year, raising the question as to whether the utilization of these funds was based on emergency breakthroughs based on new scientific developments or for other reasons. The committee strongly believes that this fund should be used solely for the purpose for which it was set up. To do otherwise is to negate the constitutional control of the Congress over appropriations.

OVERSEAS DEPENDENTS SCHOOLS

Because of the widespread interest evidenced in the overseas dependents school situation, I wish to describe briefly what action the committee has taken in that regard. The committee recommends that the per pupil limitation of \$285 be increased to \$455. This is consonant with the budget request and House action. It will provide the teachers with a \$300 annual pay raise, for which funds are included in the appropriate appropriations. In addition, the committee has pointed out in its report that if pending legislation is enacted providing further pay increases, the committee expects the Department to take the necessary action to prevent any curtailment in the level of operations of the schools. This it can do under existing laws.

Virtually the full amount for research and development is provided in the bill for the three services, as authorized in the authorization bill.

RESEARCH GRANTS

The committee has recommended that the limitation on indirect costs of research grants be continued at 20 percent, with the same language as was in the law for fiscal year 1965. The Department had requested that this section be deleted, and the House had included a provision which limited the direct costs

of research grants to something less than the total costs. The committee based its action on the belief that the Defense appropriations bill should in no wise be considered a subsidy to education. Whatever may be the merits of assistance to colleges and universities in the form of research grants as provided through other governmental departments, funds for defense should be for the purpose of providing for the national security. The contractual procedure is always available for out-of-house research requirements of the Department of Defense.

The committee believes that the Department of Defense should be bound by the 20-percent limitation for at least another year. The new plan being tried out by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and other agencies can be tested. We believe that to be a complete answer.

FOREIGN RESEARCH

Mr. President, the Department of Defense has in recent years expanded its research programs in foreign countries, and based on the total effort, the results have been most favorable. However, the recent experience with the Army's Camelot project has made it clear that the Department must coordinate these programs with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee proposed an amendment which would require the Secretary of State to approve all such projects, the chairman of the committee being, of course, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. That has led to an understanding between the departments that meets the end the Senator from Arkansas had in mind. We did not include any legislation on the subject, but we are indebted to him for a very able presentation and for having brought about the compromise arrangement. Not being able to be present, he asked that I include a memorandum by him on Department of Defense research in foreign policy matters. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator's statement appear at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon. I have a few more remarks to make on the high points of the bill.

Mr. MORSE. The statement of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is of great importance and has given me a great deal of trouble with regard to the report. I would like to comment on it, but I am willing to accommodate Senators.

Mr. STENNIS. I shall be glad to have the Senator make his comment. I wish to make a few more remarks on the most important points of the bill.

There is a limitation on repair funds for ships with respect to the 65-35 formula that has been in effect for several years.

That will be discussed in the debate later. I shall defer any explanation of it until that question arises.

ADVANCED MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT

It is not necessary to review the position the Congress has taken with respect to the development of a new manned bomber to replace the aging B-52 fleet. However, it is well known that the legislative branch has on several occasions provided the necessary funds to step up the development of such an aircraft.

It is now clear that the Air Force will have to depend on something less than an aircraft developed specifically for the strategic bombing mission to replace the B-52's. This will probably be a modification of the F-111 aircraft. However, this in no way lessens the requirement to proceed with the full development of an advanced manned strategic aircraft.

The committee recommendation includes \$22 million in new obligational authority for the development of the advanced manned strategic aircraft, which is an increase of \$7 million over the budget estimate. In addition, there is available from prior year programs \$24 million to provide for a total effort of \$46 million during fiscal year 1966. The Secretary of Defense has advised the committee that the increase of \$7 million over the budget estimate will be used during fiscal year 1966.

Mr. President, a decision on the development of this aircraft must be made next year. It was the unanimous decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department proceed with the project definition phase of the development of the advanced manned strategic aircraft during fiscal year 1966. Gen. John McConnell, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in discussing the decision on the development of this aircraft, said:

I think we can delay it until fiscal year 1967 at the latest.

The record is clear, Mr. President. The Congress and the executive branch of the Government must make a decision on this matter in the next session of the Congress.

NIKE X

Another important decision which must be made next year is that of the deployment of an antiballistic missile system, commonly referred to the Nike X.

The committee's recommendations include approximately \$400 million for the continued development of the Nike X system. This sum includes a small amount for "preliminary production engineering."

Let me point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended the inclusion of substantial production funds in fiscal year 1966 for the Nike X. This recommendation was rejected by the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense, in discussing this matter, said:

We plan to reexamine the question of production and deployment of the Nike X system again next year. Considering the vast amount of development, test and evaluation work still to be accomplished, deferral of this decision to fiscal year 1967 budget should not delay an initial operational capability by many months beyond what we could expect to achieve if we were to start production in

NUCLEAR TESTING SAFEGUARDS

Mr. President, the hearings of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on the nuclear test ban treaty led to the establishment of four specific safeguards to be followed in connection with the treaty.

These safeguards are:

First. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs.

Second. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology.

Third. The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national interest.

Fourth. The improvement of our capability to monitor the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity capabilities, and achievements.

The implementation of these safeguards is a joint responsibility of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. The recommendations of the committee include \$243.2 million for the activities of the Department of Defense in this most important program. I can assure the Members of the Senate that this sum is adequate to allow the Department to meet in full its responsibilities in carrying out these safeguards.

The committee has made a number of other relatively minor changes in the House bill which are fully covered in the committee report, which you have before you. However, I shall be happy to attempt to answer any question which may arise.

EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS

I wish to comment briefly on the action taken by the Appropriations Committee concerning research financed by the Department of Defense which touches on foreign policy matters.

Two months ago, it came to light that the Special Operations Research Office of American University, an activity which the Army created and supports, was preparing to conduct research in Chile involving delicate questions of our relations with that country. Neither our Ambassador nor the Chilean Government was consulted in advance about the project and both apparently learned of it from an article in a Chilean newspaper.

The Chilean project, it developed, was only a small part in a much more ambitious operation called "Project Camelot."

Camelot was described in a "fact sheet" provided by the Department of the Army as a "basic social science research project on preconditions of internal conflict, and on effects of indigenous governmental actions—easing, exacerbating or resolving—on those preconditions." This language seems to mean that Camelot was intended as a study of conditions that give rise to revolution and what might be done about them.

This project was but one aspect of this organization's research work for the Army. SORO's work was described by Dr. Vallance, its director, as concerning " * * * mainly the relationships with the people of the developing countries and deals with problems of aiding in the orderly process of social change and national development which is of concern to the U.S. Military Establishment." The Army provided \$2,463,000 in the last fiscal year.

Project Camelot had a budget of \$450,000 for the second half of fiscal year 1965 and \$1.1 million for fiscal 1966. The total projected cost over 3 to 4 years was to be about \$6 million. The project was cancelled in the wake of protests by Members of Congress and by Ambassador Dungan. So far as is known, SORO has not been required to turn back unexpended funds provided for Camelot. I do not know what the Army plans to do with any funds available to it for Camelot but not yet turned over to SORO. I trust we can take it for granted that any such funds will not be turned over to SORO.

Project Camelot gave great offense to the Chilean press and intellectual leaders and, presumably, to the Chilean Government as well. The reason for its offensiveness is obvious to anyone with an iota of common-sense and it seems to me it should also have been obvious to the highly trained "scientists" at American University, as well as to the Army. At a time when United States-Latin American relations are complicated by our intervention in the Dominican Republic, it is not surprising that a project like Camelot should be interpreted as having some pertinence to a possible future U.S. military intervention in Chile in the event of a revolution.

In any case, studies of possible insurgency movements within a country are an exceedingly delicate matter. I can well imagine how Members of the Senate might react if it were announced that Chilean or British or French "scientists" were initiating a study of the conditions that might give rise to racial insurgency in Los Angeles or any other American city and what might be done to prevent it.

Although Camelot has been canceled, other Department of Defense research projects are planned or underway in other Latin American countries, including Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.

I am personally concerned with such projects as Camelot because I believe there lies beneath the jargon of "science" in which these studies abound a reactionary, backward-looking policy opposed to change. Implicit in Camelot, as in the concept of "counterinsurgency," is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to the interests of the United States and that the United States must be prepared to assist, if not actually participate in, measures to repress them. It may be that I am mistaken in this interpretation; if so, I would be greatly reassured to have convincing evidence to that effect.

I ask unanimous consent that there be inserted in the RECORD two documents provided by the Department of the Army, one a fact sheet, the other a task statement on Project Camelot.

Following disclosure of the ambitious plans for Camelot and its cancellation by the Department of Defense, the President, by letter, directed the Secretary of State to establish procedures for clearing all Government-supported research involving foreign policy matters. This letter sets a clear and direct policy for all agencies, which should insure that an incident like Project Camelot will not happen again, to the embarrassment of the Nation's foreign policy. I ask unanimous consent to have the President's letter printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

This directive accomplishes the purpose I had in mind in proposing an amendment to the defense appropriation bill when it was pending before the Senate committee. I understand that the question was discussed at length by the committee and I am pleased that it included language in its report expressing its concern about the need for coordination in keeping with the President's order. The report makes mention of a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense, designed to implement the President's instructions, and I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD following my statement.

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The committee's expression is reassuring, and I am hopeful that it will follow up to insure that the Department of Defense is indeed carrying out the letter and the spirit of the President's order for coordination. I can assure the Senate that the Committee on Foreign Relations will have a continuing interest in this problem.

Beyond the immediate implications of this incident, broader issues have been raised concerning Government-financed research generally. The Federal Government is now spending some \$15 billion a year on research and development. Over \$6.7 billion is budgeted for Department of Defense research in fiscal 1966.

All too often, it seems that research is used by Government agencies either for prestige and growth purposes, or as a substitute for positive decisionmaking. This is both an unhealthy and a costly trend and I believe that Congress should take a hard look at all Government research activities.

I note, for example, that nearly \$23 million is budgeted this year for research on behavioral and social sciences by the Defense Department. \$8.3 million of this amount was allocated to the Army and out of this, \$2.7 million was to finance work of the Special Operations Research Office. The House and the Senate committees have reduced the total of this type of research by about \$4 million and I fully support this action. Project Camelot, I fear, is illustrative of the expendable nature of most of this research.

My concern is not limited to this \$23 million budget request but goes to the contribution to our society from the \$15 billion spent for Government research. Is this 15 percent of our Federal budget being spent as wisely and usefully as it should be? This is a basic problem which the Congress has allowed to grow to gargantuan proportions with insufficient consideration and evaluation. The question of sound priorities must be faced someday, but I realize that this is not the proper time for such a discussion and that we can deal only with the bill before us. But I am hopeful that before long the appropriate Senate committee, or a special committee, will undertake a thorough study of all our Government's research programs.

PROJECT CAMELOT FACT SHEET

Project Camelot: Basic social science research project on preconditions of internal conflict, and on effects of indigenous governmental actions—causing, exacerbating or resolving—on those preconditions.

Contractor: Special Operations Research Office of the American University.

Sponsor: Army Research Office, Office of Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army.

Starting dates: Authorized in August 1964; large-scale research planning commenced in January 1965.

Estimated completion date: Early 1968.

Budget: \$450,000 last half of fiscal year 1965 (January 1 to June 30, 1965). Estimated \$1.1 million for fiscal year 1966 (current fiscal year).

Current status: No research has been conducted in any country at this time. The past 6 months have been spent in planning the theoretical approaches and the research design. Possible sites for field research have not yet been chosen. The research design is expected to be completed in early fall; field work may begin in late fall.

Staff: Six professional staff members by February 1, 1965. Twenty professional staff members by June 30, 1965. Three consultants have taken on major planning responsibilities. (They are not counted in 20 staff members cited above.)

Thirty staff members expected at peak.

Total effort is planned at 140 professional man-years over length of projects.

Project director: Rex D. Hopper, B.A. (1922), Butler University (English); M.A. (1925), Butler University (comparative religion); Ph. D. (1943), University of Texas (sociology). Senior staff scientist at SORO. Previous experience and publications: chairman, department of sociology and anthropology, Brooklyn College; visiting professor of sociology under Fulbright program, National University of Buenos Aires; visiting professor of sociology under Smith-Mundt Act, National University of Paraguay, Asuncion del Paraguay; visiting professor of sociology, National University of Mexico (four summers); member of faculty, Department of Sociology, University of Texas, and of the Institute of Latin American Studies; member of staff and treasurer, Colegio de Internacional, Asuncion del Paraguay; publications on violent social change and sociology in Latin America.

TASK STATEMENT

1. Task title: "Methods for predicting and influencing social change and internal war potential" (Camelot).

2. Sponsor: OORD.

3. Consumers: DCSOPS, OORD, ACSI, CDC, all commands conducting counter-insurgency.

4. Principal investigator: To be determined.

Location of main effort: Washington, D.C., and Latin America.

5. Scope:

(a) Objective of research: To assist the Army in planning for appropriate advisory and assistance operations in developing nations by testing, in relation to one country, the feasibility of developing a social systems model which will give the following capabilities:

(1) Measurement of internal war potential: a means for identifying, measuring, and forecasting the potential for internal war.

(2) Estimation of reaction effects: a means for estimating the relative effectiveness of various governmental practices, and levels of military involvement over a wide range of environmental conditions.

(3) Information collection and handling systems: means and procedures for rapid collection, storage, and retrieval of data on internal war potential and effects of governmental action, with appropriate consideration of existing and likely future automated facilities for processing and analysis.

(b) Background: The present international situation—especially our relations with the developing countries—has resulted in a marked increase in the appreciation of the importance of the low-level conflict mission of the military. Paralleling this trend has been a growing realization among military and civilian governmental leaders that a requirement exists for earlier warning of the possibility of outbreak of internal war and greater understanding of the effects of various military and other governmental postures and actions in this environment.

Military knowledge, skills and techniques which were sufficient to meet the task of preparing for and fighting conventional warfare, both nuclear and nonnuclear, require expansion and refinement to meet the operational and military assistance demands of cold war environment.

The military requirement for research of the various types covered in this task have been expressed in CDOG 1310(A)b, 1310(B)b, 1510, and 1320(B)c; in the report of the R.D.T. & E. Limited War Task Group, August 1961 (2.2.2-4), and in the April 1963 IDA report (Barmack).

(c) Method of approach: This task will consist of a large number of interrelated studies within each of the four areas of research defined by the above four objectives. These areas of research will, in turn, be interrelated. Findings and concepts within each will direct the plans and orientations

within the others. Generally, the types of studies to be planned within each of the four areas will be the following:

(1) Model construction: The first major effort of the task will be to construct a conceptual scheme or analytic model which will identify parameters of social systems to be studied in detail for an understanding of social conflict, and will relate the findings of such studies to the operational objectives. Three types of studies may be indicated: reviews of previous attempts based on the most relevant of past work modified by findings of this task applicable to the current operational need, and simulation studies of particular aspects of conflict. During the life of the task, the new model will be modified and refined as results from all areas of study suggest improvements. At the final stage, this model will be used as a guide for the translation of research findings into a set of specifications for an information storage and retrieval system which can be tested for suitability as scientific base for operational and policy planning.

(2) Indicator analysis: Based on parameters identified in the model, studies of indicators of internal war potential will fall in the following areas:

(A) Studies of societal processes will be done to determine the underlying nature of social conflict, including both the characteristics of cleavage formation within a society, and the nature of adjudication processes.

(B) Preconditions of internal war will be studied both empirically and analytically. This will include indicators emphasizing intellectual factors (e.g., ideology), economic factors (e.g., changes in standard of living), political factors (e.g., relative strength of incumbents and potential insurgents), and societal processes (e.g., rapid social change).

(C) The processes by which conflicts and preconditions are transformed into internal war can be studied in the changing relationship between incumbents and potential insurgents, the organizing activities of both incumbents and insurgents preparatory to internal warfare, and techniques (such as terrorism) of conducting internal war.

(3) Effects of governmental actions. Using as criteria the types of societal changes indicative of potential internal war, a series of studies will be conducted on the effects of various kinds of governmental actions. This will include military activities such as civic action, training of recruits, foreign training of officers, civil affairs, internal security missions, psychological operations, socialization within the military and overt political activities. Analyses of these programs should consider scope, intensity, timing, control, coordination, subtypes and techniques of the activities. Other governmental actions to be considered will be those in which military cooperation or coordination is most important, including police function, economic development, social welfare, public information and foreign policy.

(4) Information system design and feasibility test. The translation of findings into operational use will require cost/effectiveness studies of collection, storage and retrieval processes. As a basis for such evaluations attempts will be made to collect the information required in a specified country, to integrate the information on internal war indicators and governmental actions, and to render this information into forms most usable by planners and operators.

6. Estimated professional man-years required:

Fiscal year 1965.....	20
Fiscal year 1966.....	50
Fiscal year 1967.....	50
Fiscal year 1968.....	20

7. Phasing.

Fiscal year 1965, first question: Initial coordination with relevant Government agencies; establishment of project concept.

Appointment of National Academy of Science advisory committee.

Determination of additional staff requirements and initiation of necessary recruiting.

Second question: Designation of overall project manager.

Development of more detailed planning.
Selection of appropriate countries or study sites.

Selection of special advisory panels.

Establishment of organizational structure for project.

Coordination with relevant government agencies.

Third question: Establishment of details of project projections.

Initiation of state-of-knowledge studies in all project areas.

Establishment of field office and development of field research connections.

Determination of special facility requirements.

Preparation of requests for proposals on portions of project to be subcontracted.

Fourth question: Establishment of in-house cross-policy, and systems studies.

Receipt and review of proposals for sub-contracts.

Establishment of summer study and review group.

Further detailed development of activity projection.

Augmentation of staff.

8. Fiscal year 1966: Focus of research on cross-policy field studies. Fiscal year 1967: Focus of research on field studies of the selected country. Fiscal year 1968: Conduct of feasibility test of information system for anticipating insurgency and planning counteraction.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1965.

Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Many agencies of the Government are sponsoring social science research which focuses on foreign areas and people and thus relates to the foreign policy of the United States. Some of it involves residence and travel in foreign countries and communication with foreign nationals. As we have recently learned, it can raise problems affecting the conduct of our foreign policy.

For that reason I am determined that no Government sponsorship of foreign area research should be undertaken which in the judgment of the Secretary of State would adversely affect United States foreign relations. Therefore I am asking you to establish effective procedures which will enable you to assure the propriety of Government-sponsored social science research in the area of foreign policy. I suggest that you consult with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to determine the proper procedures for the clearance of foreign affairs research projects on a Government-wide basis.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., July 12, 1965.

Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments; Director of Defense Research and Engineering; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Assistant Secretaries of Defense; General Counsel; the Special Assistant; Assistants to the Secretary of Defense; Director, Defense Communications Agency; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, Defense Supply Agency; Director, National Security Agency.

Subject: Clearance of studies with foreign policy implications.

Hereafter all studies done in or for the Department of Defense, the conduct of

which may affect the relations of the United States with foreign governments, are to be cleared with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) before they are initiated.

ROBERT S. McNAMARA,

helpful, but I think it would be much better if it were deleted.

MR. STENNIS. I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Hawaii and his attitude.

Mr. President, I had promised to yield to the Senator from South Carolina, who has a comment to make.

MR. RUSSELL of South Carolina. Mr. President, both Senators from South Carolina have studied section 639. We share the concern of the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE]. As Senators well know, we have an important shipyard in our State, with a large employment. We are aware of the difficulties that this section may involve. It is necessary for a shipyard to maintain a steady work force to be able to engage in repairing of ships. In order to be able to perform their work, it is necessary to have a regular staff of employees who can be maintained as a working force. We feel that that is as essential to our Naval Establishment as it is to have ships, particularly with respect to the Charleston Navy Yard, because we engage there in the very important work of repairing Polaris submarines.

I have discussed this matter on several occasions with the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, for whom we all have the highest regard.

I compliment him for the moving statement he made in connection with the war in Vietnam. It was reassuring and a fine statement, for the benefit of all Americans.

Returning to the section, as I understand, the addition of the proviso gives a broad area of discretion to the Secretary in order to make his determinations in accordance with what he believes is in the national interest. That makes flexible, as I understand it, the previous language of the section, which is quite direct and refers to the percentages.

Do I correctly understand that the proviso provides that flexibility of operation and that area of discretion to the Secretary in carrying out this section?

MR. STENNIS. The Senator has read the language correctly. It does give the Secretary discretion. He can divide this as he may direct, so long as he bases his conclusion upon the facts, the sole guide being the public interest. The Senator used the term "national interest." The words here are "public interest," which is equivalent to the same thing.

MR. RUSSELL of South Carolina. They mean the same thing.

MR. STENNIS. If he finds this formula too rigid or to inconsistent with the public interest, based on the urgency of the requirements of the fleet, with reference to repair, alteration, or conversion of naval vessels, he can do it in any way he may direct. That language was put in to give him the discretion to which the Senator has referred.

MR. RUSSELL of South Carolina. Let me ask the Senator another question in connection with the military procurement authorization bill: Was not a section similar to this omitted therefrom, and would that not normally be the place where such a provision as this would appear?

August 25, 1965

Mr. STENNIS. There is a section in that bill, and being a member of both committees, I made the point at the time, that I did not believe that the language precluded the Appropriations Committee from recommending the inclusion of the "65-35" provision, and that it did not preclude the Senate from adopting such a provision. I believe that I reported that to the Senate when the conference report on the procurement authorization was considered. I know that the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] was in the same conference.

There is language on the subject, but this is a limitation on the use of funds included in this bill, in my opinion.

Mr. RUSSELL of South Carolina. The impression given to the Secretary, I hope, will not be employed to reduce the effectiveness of the very important naval shipyards we have—especially the one in Charleston.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I hope that it does not involve a Navy yard in his State. It is a valuable yard facility. This language has been in the law now for 3 consecutive years. The Senator's yard has prospered greatly under this very language.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Mississippi yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. STENNIS. I am happy now to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts. He has worked on this bill for a long time.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Let me say to both Senators from South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL and Mr. THURMOND], to the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. McINTYRE], who I see is on his feet, and also to the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE], that the 65-35 section has been in the bill for 3 or 4 years. The Navy does not like it particularly, but they say they can live with it. The Secretary of Defense says that he will get by with it.

Under the public interest proviso, there has been more money spent in the Naval shipyards than the 65 percent in the last two years. I believe that the actual amount spent in Naval yards last year was all but 33 percent. I am confident that this provision, with its broad discretion in the public interest, will be satisfactory.

The House has nothing in the bill on this subject. If there are strong demands by the House conferees we can leave the section out.

From my own personal point of view, I would not care too much to see it left out, but we have put it in for the last 3 or 4 years because of divergent interests brought up on the floor of the Senate and, therefore, we felt that as the Navy can get along with it, and the Secretary of Defense can get along with it, it was better to have it in and take it to conference.

Mr. RUSSELL of South Carolina. I am encouraged that the House conferees may be insistent, and I am delighted to hear the expressions of the Senator from Massachusetts that he does not feel strongly on this point.

Mr. STENNIS. On the question of the public interest, let me ask the Senator

from Massachusetts, has it not proved to be an adequate vehicle to take care of any situation that can arise on either side of the controversy?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The answer is "yes," obviously.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I am especially interested in section 639 of the Senate version of the bill since the Senate Committee on Appropriations amended it to include a provision that at least 35 percent of the funds appropriated for repair, alteration, and conversion of naval vessels should be utilized in private shipyards.

I was pleased that the House of Representatives did not include any such provision in the bill which it passed. The provision which the Senate committee wrote into the bill would provide a degree of flexibility. The Senate provision makes it possible for the Secretary of Defense to depart from the limitation when he determines that application of the limitation is inconsistent with the public interest.

However, it is my belief that it would be the wiser course to omit entirely the provision which is in the bill, as did the House. The allocation of repairs, alterations, and conversions of naval vessels between Navy shipyards and privately owned shipyards should be made, particularly in this time of emergency, on the basis of efficiency, proficiency, time factors, and economy, rather than on any arbitrary allocation.

The decision should be made on a case-to-case basis by the Navy Department.

It is my hope, therefore, that the position of the House on this matter will prevail in the conference, as I feel that this would be in the best interests of the national security.

We in South Carolina have one of the finest naval shipyards in the country. We are very much interested in this shipyard. Still, I would not take this position if I did not feel it to be in the best interest of national security; but, unless we keep these shipyards ready at any moment to go forward for repair, alteration, or conversion of vessels, I believe that we could be in trouble.

The capabilities of our naval shipyards are as essential a part of our defense forces as the vessels which they construct and repair. We must maintain these capabilities by utilizing them. Only in this way can we insure that the requisite skills and experience in shipbuilding and repair will be available in critical emergencies.

We take pride that those employed in the naval shipyard located in Charleston, S.C., are skilled employees. They are dedicated, regular employees who know their jobs. In my judgment, it is important that we keep this reservoir in store, to be used at any time it may be needed.

On the bill as a whole, I compliment the able Senator from Mississippi. He has done an outstanding job. It has

been my great pleasure to cooperate with him.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from South Carolina. I appreciate his cooperation. I do not wish to be misunderstood. As I said, I believe that we need some surveillance around the flexible language in the bill but, of course, if this provision goes to conference, I, as a conferee, will support the Senate position.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from New Hampshire. I know that he has a great interest in this matter.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, as usual, the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations has done an outstanding job in its consideration of this year's appropriations for the Department of Defense. As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I would like to express my admiration of the careful, meticulous job done by the Senator from Mississippi and his colleagues in shaping the bill now before the Senate.

I was quite concerned, however, to learn of the inclusion in this bill of section 639, which has attempted to restore a modified version of the often discredited 65-35 formula.

As Senators will know, the Secretary of Defense testified before the Committees on Armed Services of both the Senate and the House that retention of the 65-35 formula for the distribution of work between public and private shipyards would result in increased costs to the taxpayers for ship repair, alteration, and conversion. Both Chambers of the Congress concurred by striking the 65-35 formula from the defense authorization bill. This action was taken with the full and enthusiastic support of the Department of Defense.

After the Congress had thus expressed itself on this subject, the House enacted H.R. 9221, the bill before us, without any attempt to restore the 65-35 provision. I was disappointed to learn that the Senate Committee on Appropriations had thus acted on its own to insert this give-away of the taxpayers' dollars which section 639 represents.

I am hopeful that the conferees on H.R. 9221 will see the wisdom of deleting section 639. I express this hope free from any regional interest, and base it solely on the fact that, to the best of my knowledge, every knowledgeable expert in the field has recommended that the 65-35 formula be abolished. Among these experts I would list the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

The issue here is not whether or not U.S. naval vessels will be repaired, overhauled, or converted. The issue is simply whether the U.S. Navy will be permitted to do this work with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of expense to the taxpayers.

Mr. President, section 639 is bad medicine for the ills of our domestic shipbuilding industry. Its anticompetitive effect is simple; it simply guarantees to the commercial yards that, no matter

how slipshod their work, the Navy will continue to send work to them. Its impact upon quality control, overall competitiveness, and the ability of management is easy to foresee. The retention of section 639 will represent another victory for the private shipbuilding interests of this Nation at the taxpayers' expense.

Mr. President, I am appreciative of the remarks of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], and the remarks of the Senator from Mississippi, indicating that there will be a considerable amount of flexibility in this provision as it is administered by the Secretary of Defense.

I, for one, thinking in terms of the Vietnam situation, thinking in the terms the Senator has shown to the American people through his analysis of defense matters, believe that next year, with strikes up and down the west coast in private yards, as well as up and down the east coast, the Secretary of Defense should not have this limitation placed upon him. I urge the Senator and the other conferees on the part of the Senate, when they go to conference with the House, to give serious thought to the complete deletion of section 639.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. He has stated his thoughts on this subject very well. I appreciate his remarks. I believe I should now describe the committee action and the reasons therefor.

LIMITATION ON SHIP REPAIR FUNDS

The Department of Defense Appropriation Acts for fiscal years 1963, 1964, and 1965 included the so-called 65-35 formula with respect to the allocation of Navy ship conversion, alteration, and repair work between the Navy shipyards and the privately owned shipyards. This provision includes an escape clause that allows such work to be allocated without regard to the formula when the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the national interest to do so. The Secretary did make use of this provision during fiscal year 1965.

The budget proposed that this provision not be included in the bill for fiscal year 1966, and it was not included in the House bill. However, the committee recommends the inclusion of the provision. In recommending this provision, the committee considered section 303 of the Department of Defense Procurement and Research Act—Public Law 89-37—which provides:

The assignment of naval ship conversion, alteration, and repair projects shall be made on the basis of economic and military considerations and shall not be restricted by the requirements that certain portions of such naval shipwork be assigned to particular types of shipyards or to particular geographical areas by similar requirements.

Mr. President, when I presented the conference report on the procurement authorization bill to the Senate, I made it clear that this provision did not restrict the right of the Committee on Appropriations to recommend, and the Senate to adopt the 65-35 provision, so long as that provision is tied to the funds appropriated in the bill containing the provision.

In recommending the inclusion of this provision, the committee has taken into consideration several factors, such as—

First. The fact that the United States has an excess of shipyard capacity.

Second. The fact that it is in our national interest to maintain as much of this capacity as possible.

Third. The fact that during the past 3 years the provision has not resulted in any serious problems for the Navy shipyards.

Mr. President, there is one other point that should be stressed. This bill includes \$843,173,000 for conversion, alteration, and repair work. Under the Navy's preliminary plan the private shipyards would be allocated \$221,865,000 of this total, which is about \$3 million more than they were allocated during fiscal year 1965. However, this allocation represents only 26.3 percent of the total. This allocation is similar to the allocation to private yards during fiscal year 1962, which was the year before the 65-35 provision was introduced and when the private yards were allocated only 21.6 percent of such work.

In addition, it is generally known that the Department of Defense is seriously considering a proposal whereby shipyards in the United Kingdom will be allowed to compete on an equal basis with American shipyards for the construction of a limited number of Navy noncombatant ships. These ships are of the type that would ordinarily be built in the privately owned shipyards in this country. For these reasons, the committee urges the adoption of the current provision contained in section 639.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, first, I would like to add my compliments to those of Senators who have expressed their appreciation to the Senator from Mississippi for the outstanding work he has done on the bill. We have come to expect such fine work from him. I appreciate also his remarks on the Vietnam situation, which I believe are most helpful.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief comment to supplement the remarks that have already been made about section 639, to indicate my reservations with respect to it.

The Department of Defense has constantly stressed its dedication to the principle of the strongest possible Defense Establishment, combined with emphasis on cost effectiveness. I know that the Senator from Mississippi has the same objective.

Congress could take no action more effectively designed to accomplish this purpose than to repeal the 65-35 provision for conversion, alteration, and repair of naval vessels. The Secretary of the Navy has pointed out that an increase in the overhaul of nuclear submarines accomplished at naval shipyards, as opposed to private shipyards, would constitute a substantial savings to the U.S. Treasury.

With a defense budget running over \$50 billion a year, we must look for areas where savings can be made, especially when these savings will serve to sharpen the skills of craftsmen who will be among those first called in the event of a national emergency.

If it is the objective of Congress to insist upon the most effective expenditure of Federal funds, repeal of this provision

it seems to me, would be in the public interest. When the Joint Senate-House Conference Committee meets to consider the defense appropriations bill, I hope that the Senate conferees will seriously consider supporting this suggestion.

I am reassured, as also are the Senator from New Hampshire and other Senators, by the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi that the language of section 639, as it is now included in the bill, is designed to insure flexibility in the exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Defense. For that assurance I am very grateful to the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much for his fine remarks and presentation. I know that he has a great interest in this subject.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, earlier this year the military procurement authorization bill was enacted. This bill, now Public Law 89-37, includes section 303 which reads as follows:

The assignment of naval ship conversion, alteration, and repair projects shall be made on the basis of economic and military considerations and shall not be restricted by requirements that certain portions of such naval shipwork be assigned to particular types of shipyards or to particular geographical areas or by similar requirements.

The Secretary of Defense requested the elimination of the statutory 35-65 ratio for the allocation of ship repair, alteration, and conversion work between privately owned and public shipyards. Pointing out that this work can be accomplished with essentially equal efficiency in private shipyards and naval shipyards, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze feels that the distribution of this work between the two categories of shipyards should be based upon consideration of assuring efficient utilization of shipyard capacities and capabilities rather than a rigid 35-65 division. He has pointed out that as more of this work is assigned to the Navy yards, it is more economical to the Defense Department because they operate with fixed overhead costs that are largely independent of their assigned workload.

Being fully acquainted with the excellent operations of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, I can attest to the correctness of the Navy's judgment.

It is, therefore, with regret, Mr. President, that I note the addition to H.R. 9221 by the Committee on Appropriations of the statutory 35-65 division. This action controverts the policy established by Congress only a few months ago in Public Law 89-37. I earnestly hope that the Senate-House conferees will delete section 639 from the bill.

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I shall vote for this very important and necessary appropriation bill which provides funds for the military functions of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1966.

I do want, however, to express my disappointment that the Senate Appropriations Committee added language—section 639—requiring that at least 35 percent of Navy ship repair, alteration, and conversion funds be expended in privately owned shipyards, leaving 65 percent for Navy yards.

Section 639 is almost identical to language carried in the defense appro-

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bill the past 3 years. This year, however, Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze recommended repeal of this arbitrary allocation of Navy ship repair, alteration and conversion work.

His superior, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, recommended repeal of the 35-65 proviso.

His superior, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Lyndon B. Johnson, recommended repeal of the 35-65 proviso.

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee recommended omission of the 35-65 proviso, the full House Appropriations Committee concurred, and the House of Representatives, in approving the pending bill (H.R. 9221), also omitted this restriction.

I have opposed the 35-65 proviso from the very beginning—and for precisely the same reasons the administration now opposes it.

I believe national defense considerations, not an arbitrary dollar division, should be the first and foremost basis for allocating Navy ship conversion, alteration, and repair work.

I am glad that those administration officials most closely concerned with Navy fleet readiness and combat capability now agree that the 35-65 proviso is not in the best interest of national security.

I would like to remind my colleagues that earlier this year Congress enacted as part of the defense procurement and research and development authorization act a section stating that assignment of such Navy shipwork be on the basis of economic and military considerations, not under restrictive requirements that it be assigned to particular types of shipyards or to particular geographic areas.

The section of this enactment—Public Law 89-37—reads as follows:

SEC. 303. The assignment of naval ship conversion, alteration, and repair projects shall be made on the basis of economic and military considerations and shall not be restricted by requirements that certain portions of such naval shipwork be assigned to particular types of shipyards or to particular geographical areas or by similar requirements.

Thus, only last May, the Senate and the House went on record opposing restrictions to allocate Navy ship conversion, alteration, and repair work by type of shipyard.

Today, we are asked to approve a bill containing a section that allocates such work by type of shipyard.

While I would like very much to see section 639 of the pending bill stricken, I realize the practical difficulties in attempting to do this.

Section 639 reads as follows:

Of the funds made available in this Act for repair, alteration, and conversion of naval vessels, at least 35 per centum shall be available for such repair, alteration, and conversion in privately owned shipyards: *Provided*, That if determined by the Secretary of Defense to be inconsistent with the public interest based on urgency of requirement of the fleet to have such vessels repaired, altered, or converted as required above, such work may be done in Navy or private shipyards as he may direct.

This is identical to language in the defense appropriation bill for fiscal year

1965, except that the words "of the fleet" have been added this year.

It is recognized that section 639 is subject to a point of order and could be stricken from the bill on the ground that it is legislation in an appropriation bill. The matter constituting legislation is the language beginning "*Provided*, That" through the end of the section.

To avoid a point of order, an amendment could be offered to strike the proviso clause. Section 639 then would read:

Of the funds made available in this Act for repair, alteration, and conversion of naval vessels, at least 35 per centum shall be available for such repair, alteration, and conversion in privately owned shipyards.

This would be even worse than section 639 as it stands, for then the Secretary of Defense would have no discretion whatsoever to exceed the 65 percent for Navy yards even if fleet requirements demanded that additional work be performed in Navy yards.

As one who believes allocation of such work should be on the basis of defense requirements, I certainly would not want to deprive the Secretary of Defense of the authority to allocate more than 65 percent to Navy yards when fleet requirements are urgent.

The parliamentary situation being as it is and the possible alternatives worse than section 639 as it stands, the question then arises, "Why not move to strike section 639 from the bill?"

This was attempted last year and was overwhelmingly rejected by voice vote of the Senate. My assessment of the situation today shows the result would be the same if anyone tried to delete section 639. A vote in the Senate to retain 639 would make it much more difficult to remove section 639 if the bill goes to House-Senate conference committee.

Therefore, I am reluctantly forced to bow to the realities of the situation.

I am as vigorously opposed to this section now, as I have always been.

I am hopeful that it will be deleted in the House-Senate conference committee.

Despite my objection to this one section, I shall vote to pass the defense appropriation bill as a vital measure to our national security.

I hope the conferees on the part of the Senate will reconsider their position so far as the 35-65 proviso is concerned and take note of the fact that all the administration experts in this field have recommended that the 35-65 proviso be repealed.

I am glad to hear the assurance of the Senators who are in charge of the appropriation bill that flexibility will be used in working out the 35-65-percent proviso. I do hope that if the conferees accept the Senate version, this flexibility will be given.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much for his statement, which covers the subject very well.

Mr. President, I offer an amendment, which I send to the desk, and ask to have stated. It is a technical amendment which would correct the reference to a section number.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RUSSELL of South Carolina in the chair).

The amendment of the Senator from Mississippi will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 38, line 4, it is proposed to strike out "521" and insert "621".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi.

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 417

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 417 and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin will be stated.

The legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment will be printed in the Record.

The amendment (No. 417) offered by Mr. NELSON is as follows:

On page 2, line 10, strike out "\$4,092,291,-000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$4,107,400,-900".

On page 48, beginning with line 1, strike out all down through line 3.

On page 48, line 4, strike out "642" and insert in lieu thereof "641".

Mr. NELSON. First, I should like to say to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] that I have read extensively in the last two volumes of the hearings conducted by the Senator, which total approximately 2,000 pages. I join other Senators present in commending the Senator from Mississippi and the committee for an extremely thoughtful and probing hearing of the Defense Appropriation request.

My difference, considered alongside the \$47 billion appropriation amounts to something less than one one-thousandth of 1 percent. The amount involved in this is \$15 million.

Mr. STENNIS. On behalf of the committee, as well as personally, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for his remarks. The Senator is certainly within his rights to offer an amendment, and I shall be very much interested in the points that he makes.

Does the Senator wish to have a yeas-and-nays vote on his amendment?

Mr. NELSON. I shall ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment. However, I do not believe there is a sufficient number of Senators present to order the yeas and nays, so I shall wait until there is a quorum call.

Mr. President, the amendment proposes to restore \$15 million to the appropriation for the purpose of instituting the Army special training enlistment program called STEP.

The House of Representatives included the amount in the appropriation bill passed by the House.

The appropriation for the STEP program is supported and was supported in the testimony by Secretary of Defense McNamara. It was supported in the testimony by Stephen Alles, Secretary of the Army, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Maj. Gen. B. F. Taylor, Director of Army

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Budget, Office, Controller of the Army, Brig. Gen. Lloyd B. Ramsay, Deputy Commander, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., Tilton Davis, Jr., Director of Educational Development, 5th U.S. Army, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There is rather extensive testimony in the Record on the Senate side. I have all of that testimony and all of the questions that were raised and, unlike the committee on the Senate side, I became strongly convinced that this is a very sound, thoughtful, creative and fruitful proposal that ought to be adopted.

As I have said, the purpose of this amendment is to restore to the budget the funds for the Army's special training enlistment program, or STEP. The Appropriations Committee deleted these funds, and added section 641 to the bill, which states:

None of the funds provided in this act shall be available for the expenses of the special training enlistment program (STEP) or similar programs.

The House Committee on Appropriations and the House of Representatives voted to support the Army recommendation. I think the reasons for supporting the House position are extremely compelling.

The amendment would strike section 641 from the bill, and add \$15,208,900 to the "Military personnel, Army" appropriations account, the amount of money allowed for STEP by the House.

STEP was conceived by the Army as a way of reducing its reliance on the draft. Because of the fact that it uses large numbers of draftees, the Army has the highest requirements for those who enlist voluntarily of any of the services; they are so high, in fact, that in fiscal year 1964, the Army turned away 70,000 men who wished to volunteer but could not qualify.

The Army is properly concerned about having to turn these men away, particularly since they are at the same time accepting over 100,000 men from the draft each year, many of whom did not meet Army enlistment standards either.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. NELSON. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Do I correctly understand that there are two rules which differ from each other—one rule relating to the physical and mental qualifications which are applicable to volunteers and a totally different rule which is applicable to men who are drafted?

Mr. NELSON. That is correct. The Army accepts the draftees who on their academic tests achieve a percentile of 21. That means that any draftee who achieves a score of 21 has 20 percent of the population academically beneath him.

In the volunteer program the Army will accept only volunteers who achieve a percentile of 31, which is substantially higher. So we have a situation in which we are drafting into the Army men who achieve a percentile of 21 and who do not want to be in the Army, and rejecting men who receive a percentile of 28, 29, or 30, on the grounds that that is not high enough for a volunteer.

Mr. LAUSCHE. That means that a young man who wants to volunteer is rejected unless he reaches the level of 31.

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. But when the supply of volunteers is exhausted and draftees are needed, a person who did not qualify as a volunteer could qualify as a draftee.

Mr. NELSON. That is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator from Wisconsin believe that this difference in testing is not sound?

Mr. NELSON. The difference in the testing may be sound enough. In other words, it may be defensible to draft someone who has a percentile of 21 and is going to stay in the Army for only 2 years, but decline to accept a volunteer having a percentile of 31 who intends to spend his career in the service.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. NELSON. However, I do not think it is defensible to refuse to accept a volunteer who achieves less than a percentile of 31, not because he does not have the intellectual capacity but because he has not had the reading, writing, and arithmetic required.

The purpose of the amendment is not to reduce the percentile but to provide that the Army may accept volunteers who receive a percentile of less than 31, send them to school at Fort Leonard Wood or elsewhere, and give them training in reading, writing, and arithmetic, so that they can take an examination and achieve a percentile of 31 or above. Then we will have a volunteer who will make a good soldier and will meet the standards of the Army.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I have received a number of letters in this period of international stress inquiring why many persons are being rejected because they are labeled as dull normal. The query is: Are they not qualified to do some work in the military service? There is menial work they could do. I thought those letters made a fairly strong point.

I subscribe to what the Senator from Wisconsin is trying to do in his amendment.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator from Ohio.

During the past 3 years, 91,000 men came in through the draft who would have been refused if they had volunteered. Since it was felt that a willing volunteer frequently makes a better soldier than an unwilling draftee, and since it is a great expense to the Army to have to train a new set of draftees every 2 years, while a volunteer is in for at least 3 years, and is also much more likely to reenlist, the Army began to look about for some way to bring in more of the men it was turning away, while at the same time maintaining its high standards.

The answer they developed was STEP. Under this program, volunteers who are qualified except for a correctible medical deficiency, or a correctible educational deficiency, but not both, can be accepted as volunteers on a provisional basis, and assigned to STEP.

In the case of those with a medical deficiency, the condition must be remediable within 6 weeks; after that time

the man must meet the regular Army physical standards.

There is one exception to the 6-week time limit under the Army proposal: if a man is underweight or overweight, and the doctors are confident that his weight can be brought within the prescribed bounds, but not within 6 weeks, he will still be eligible.

In fiscal 1964, there were 12,600 volunteers who passed all other standards but were medically disqualified. The Army estimates that 900 of these would have qualified for STEP.

The major part of STEP, however, would deal with those whose mental test scores were too low. The Army requires a score of 31 on the Armed Forces qualifying test—higher than any of the other services—and 56,000 volunteers were turned down in fiscal 1964 solely because they did not achieve this score. Of these, about 41,000 scored high enough to be eligible to enter the STEP program if it were instituted.

Until the program has operated for 4 years on an experimental basis, the Army proposed to enlist 15,000 each year out of the pool of around 42,000 eligibles for STEP.

Those who are admitted with an educational deficiency will be placed in a special 14-week training program at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. Here they will spend half of each day receiving basic combat training, and half the day receiving instruction in subjects like English, arithmetic, social studies, and science. This will be a stretchout of 6 weeks in the normal 8-week basic combat training course.

At the end of the 14 weeks, trainees who have satisfactorily completed their basic combat training, and whom the Director of General Educational Development believes to have advanced adequately, will take the Armed Forces qualifying test again. If they now score 31 or higher, they will be given 2 weeks' leave and then sent to advanced individual training like any other enlistee.

Those who fail the Armed Forces qualifying test this second time, or who do not take it because the Director feels they are not ready, will be sent to a modified program combining advanced individual training and general educational development; for 3 weeks they will receive 6 hours of general education and 2 hours of military training each day, and will then take the Armed Forces qualifying test a third time.

Those who still fail will receive one final chance; they will continue for another 5 weeks of modified training, receiving up to 4 hours per day of general education on their deficient subjects, combined with on-the-job training as basic engineer pioneers, learning to use engineer tools, and the basic techniques of carpentry.

At the end of this period, the trainee will take the Armed Forces qualifying test. If he scores 31 or higher, he will be assigned to an Active Army unit; if he scores lower, he will be discharged.

The Army for some time now has operated similar programs of general educational development for draftees who were below their regular stand-

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ards—at present, men are eligible for the draft if they score as low as 21.

Mr. Tilton Davis, Director of Educational Development of the 5th Army, presented some figures to the Appropriations Committees on the success met by these programs at installations in the 5th Army.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of Mr. Davis made before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on January 26, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY MR. TILTON DAVIS, JR., DIRECTOR OF GENERAL EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 5TH U.S. ARMY, BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE, JANUARY 26, 1965

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, you recall that Mr. Ailes spoke of the AFQT—Armed Forces Qualifying Test—test score of 31 being the mental standard for enlistment but that some exceptions are made in the case of high school graduates. He further pointed out that during the past 3 years some 91,000 draftees were taken into the Army who achieved scores below this minimum.

The data I will present will be based on results some of these men have achieved in the Army's general educational development program.

After a man is accepted into service, the AFQT score is not used. The Army administers additional tests to specifically identify the aptitudes of individuals. The Army classification battery, or ACB, is the principal test. It consists of 11 parts. By combining these part scores, aptitude areas of individuals are determined. The aptitude area scores are one of the factors used by classification personnel to assign individuals to MOS training and by service schools as course prerequisites.

One of the aptitude area scores is called the general technical or GT. The two parts which make up the GT are the verbal test and arithmetical reasoning. GT aptitude area scores have a high correlation with scores achieved on the AFQT. A score of 31 on the AFQT is about equal to a score of 90 on the GT aptitude area. An AFQT score of 15 is about a GT score of 75.

Since GT scores are recorded on official records when educational level surveys are taken, individuals whose GT scores are below 90 are identified. When the military training situation permits, these men are enrolled in on-duty or off-duty classes and instruction is given in reading, social studies, arithmetic, and general physical sciences.

The two charts which follow (not printed in the Record) show the effect of GED instruction on the general technical score of students. These experience data are from two 5th Army installations for classes conducted in the past 9 months.

The first chart shows the GT scores achieved by 471 men before and after 210 hours of instruction. The GT scores are plotted on the horizontal and number of men achieving each score is shown on the vertical. For example, this point shows that the possible range of scores on the GT Aptitude Area Test is from 50 to 160 points.

Note on the original test, men achieved scores ranging from the minimum possible, 50 points, to a high of 119 with the average or mean of 83.5 points. After instruction, some men still remained at the minimum—these were nonreaders—whereas the highest score attained was 136 points. The mean on retest was 94.1 points, an increase of 10.6 points over the original test.

This second chart shows data comparable to the first chart except that the length of instruction was 400 hours compared to 210 hours for the first group.

On the original test, scores ranged from 60 to 108 points with mean of 84.8 points, only 1.3 points above mean of the first group. Of the total 125 men, 99 had below 90 GT score. After 400 hours of instruction, the range of scores was 73 to 139. The mean on retest was 112.6, a raise of 27.8 points from the original mean. On retest only eight men had GT scores below 90.

Attention is invited to the fact that a number of men achieved scores of 115 or higher, and 43 men had scores of 120, the qualifying score for some of the hard skill MOS schools.

But there are additional advantages of STEP that cannot be so objectively measured but surely are as real.

First, students can be carefully observed by military trainers and skilled teachers; personal problems and difficulties can be identified and appropriate professional guidance provided to overcome maladjustments.

Second, special programs of instruction can be developed to meet the specific educational needs of the individual, to bring his abilities into line with his interests.

And third, opportunity to truly measure the value of the program—over a long period of time—will now be made available.

The major problem of the GED portion of STEP will be the hiring of teachers—teachers able, interested, and desiring to work with young adults and knowledgeable of the characteristics of students they will have. It is our hope and plan to secure teachers nationwide, from rural and urban areas, from a large number of colleges, and with a variety of all ethnic, economic, social, and racial backgrounds. Through an effective program of teacher training and orientation, we will be able to better understand the personal attitudes, motivations, and frustrations of students who themselves will have great differences of culture and education. We will have assistance of personnel located at all Army installations in our hiring efforts. We fully expect to fill our faculty of 250 civilian teachers, but the task will be difficult in terms of quality and quantity of teachers desired.

During the first 14 weeks of training, concurrent with BCT, the GED portion of the program will consist of 280 hours apportioned approximately as follows: 80 hours, English and reading; 60 hours, arithmetic and basic mathematics; 50 hours, social studies; 50 hours, elementary science; 40 hours, examination and evaluation.

It should be remembered that the specified hours allotted GED in the subject areas above will be modified as required to meet the educational needs of the individual trainees.

Ninety hours of GED will be given those trainees during the first 3 weeks of the AIT/GED phase of the program and 100 hours of GED instruction will be given to those who cannot advance to regular AIT at the end of this period.

The USAFI achievement test II, USAFI achievement test III or the advanced California achievement test, as appropriate, will be administered at the beginning of the STEP GED program to determine the functional grade levels of STEP trainees. Other appropriate tests may be used as necessary during the instructional phases to determine the educational progress of trainees—to permit identification and regrouping of rapid and slow learners and to determine which trainees require increased individual attention or additional instruction after duty hours in supervised study halls.

In summary, then, it can be concluded that the STEP academic program will surely raise a large percentage of STEP students to

and above the academic level required for enlistment. But more important, the students, through carefully designed guidance and instructional programs, will continue their personal growth after they complete STEP, and be able to work effectively in the Army structure.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. NELSON. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Does not the Senator feel that these young men should be trained in the educational fundamentals by the Job Corps rather than to place this responsibility upon the Army, which has its hands full training soldiers?

Mr. NELSON. As the distinguished Senator from South Carolina knows there is testimony in the hearings on this exact point. I read the questions and answers of representatives of the Department of Defense, who said no. I believe the Department of Defense is correct.

I do not believe there is any way to combine the education necessary to qualify and the necessary military training of the individual under any public training organization or the HEW. On that exact point, the testimony of Secretary Ailes was as follows:

Lastly—and the most difficult question always is—the Job Corps is already going to do this. They are going to take people in and one of the things they hope to train them for is to make them eligible for military service. I say that is fine. But that is not a substitute, in our mind. That is not the same thing. It does not do the same thing for us that our program will do.

This program of ours enables us to give a man education under military discipline, at the same time he is getting his basic training. It enables us to screen and evaluate and to be sure the men who come in, who originally could not meet our standards, are men who are going to make good soldiers.

All we are talking about here is just some 10,000 additional spaces.

I submit this is a program the Army should engage in. It will be useful to us in the future. If we get into a situation where we have to broaden the base rapidly, we will have learned how to bring up the qualifications of people. I am supported in this by the Chief and the Vice Chief of Staff and a group of hard-working people of the Army staff who have studied this program and are convinced it is a good program.

There is, as the Senator knows, testimony throughout the record on this exact point. I thought that the Army's position was compelling and persuasive as to that question. However, obviously the Senate committee, of which I believe the Senator is a member, did not believe so. But on the House side, the committee and the House of Representatives endorsed and adopted the Army position.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the policies of the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense are guided by the policy handed down by the administration. Does the Senator not feel, in view of the responsibility which the Army has to train people to fight in Vietnam and perhaps in other places, that nonmilitary training should be handled by the Job Corps?

I remind the Senator that the Office of Economic Opportunity has issued an

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administrative manual, in December 1964, which provides that the educational program in the Job Corps centers is geared to helping young people get and hold jobs in which they can advance, helping them to return to school, helping them to enter the MTTA, which is the Manpower Training and Development Association, and other vocational training programs, or helping them to qualify to enlist in the Armed Forces.

Mr. President, one of the purposes of the Job Corps is to prepare young people to enter the Armed Forces. That is one of the big arguments that was presented here for the Job Corps—that the Job Corps would prepare young people to enter the Armed Forces. Figures were cited to show—as the Senator cited figures this morning—how many were disqualified for one reason or another. The Job Corps was organized. It is now in operation. This is one of its purposes. Why should we want to duplicate any program? Why should we not allow the Job Corps to do this job and let it provide the educational training and let the Army devote its full attention to its military responsibilities? The Army has enough responsibilities without having to operate a school for these young people.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, there are several answers to that. First, the Army is already doing exactly what we are talking about. The testimony of the military spokesman for the Army pointed out that they are taking draftees with a percentile of 21, which is 10 less than that required of a volunteer. They then train them in a program similar to that which is underway now. Second, a substantial portion of the Army function is educational, educating soldiers and training them in a thousand skills.

Mr. THURMOND. The Army facilities are limited. The Army is not equipped to take on the responsibility of training additional thousands of young men whom the Job Corps could train, whom the civilian vocational schools or other agencies could train. They would have to train some of them because there would be no other way out. However, why should we place additional responsibilities on the Army and require it to do more training than it is equipped to do when such training could be done by some other agency?

Mr. NELSON. I believe that the answer is very simple. Under this program the Army would take 15,000 volunteers who they think would qualify. Those 15,000 volunteers would be trained and they estimate 12,000 would achieve a percentile of 31. Those volunteers would be likely to remain in the Army much longer. That has been proved by the record. They would be in the Army because they wanted to be. They would replace 12,000 draftees who do not want to be in the Army and who may never be able to achieve a percentile of 31 anyway.

It seems to me that, instead of doing that, we foolishly say, "No." There is a man who wants to be a soldier. He has the intellectual capacity to become a soldier. So, instead of letting him make a career out of the Army and become a good soldier, we say, "No, we will not

give you the training, but we will draft men with a percentile of 21, some of whom could never reach a percentile of 31." So we are drafting men with a low percentile and giving them that training, and yet refusing to take those who want to join.

It does not make any sense to me. We provide education in all walks of life. We provide education in our schools, which education helps young men enter the Army. We provide education in the Job Corps. We provide education in the Army. The Army is the biggest single educator in America. It has more people taking correspondence courses and more people taking technical courses of all kinds than any school, university in this country.

This is a function that the Army could handle very well. As to the Job Corps, I am glad to see them doing this job. However, this would not do a volunteer any good. A young man could qualify with a percentile of 31 and above and still not be able to get into the Job Corps. The Job Corps is not able to accept them all.

If anybody were to read the testimony carefully, he would have to come to the conclusion that the Army position is sound.

This program would relieve us of drafting thousands of men. We are talking about drafting married men. What sense would that make if we could obtain volunteers, as the Army believes? Their experience seems reliable to me. They have the test scores to prove what they can do, and how they can raise the percentile.

The proof has been submitted as a part of the record. I believe that the Senator has read it. Why should we draft married men when the Army can obtain about 35,000 additional volunteers a year who can qualify for the Army standards, which are higher for enlistment than are the standards in any other service. I cannot understand such a position.

Mr. THURMOND. The Army is possibly the greatest training center in the United States. But it should not be required to take on additional duties and have to train those who have fallen below the standard which the Army has set, because then it would take the time of the Army away from its main functions in order to give elementary nonmilitary training to people who could receive that training elsewhere.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I do not believe the Senator's argument holds water.

We spend a vast amount of time training draftees. The draftees come in for 2 years and then quit. We would not have to continue to train them if we had volunteers who stayed in for more than the 2-year period.

On the basis of these figures, the Army estimates that about 80 percent of the 15,000 STEP trainees, or 12,000 men, will successfully pass through the program each year. This will provide 12,000 additional military personnel. If this program is as successful as the Army believes it will be, it will ultimately provide

33,000 additional military personnel annually.

It has been argued that this program belongs in the poverty program, rather than the Army; that is why it was cut out of the budget by the Appropriations Committee. There can be little question that STEP, like any program of education, will help to reduce poverty; but that is not its main purpose. The main purpose of STEP is to reduce the Army's training costs, and to secure a higher caliber of manpower for the Army.

In fiscal year 1965, 266,000 men went through basic training on their way into the Active Army; combined with those who received basic training in the Reserve and the National Guard, this made a total of 388,000 men who were given basic training by the Army. The Air Force and the Navy, by comparison, trained about 115,000 each.

If STEP proves successful in the 4-year trial period, the Army may eventually be able to enroll all 42,000 of the men who volunteer each year and are turned down because of a correctible medical or educational deficiency. The Army estimates that 80 percent of those entering STEP will successfully complete the course. It is thought that it will be closer to 90 percent. However, 80 percent is used as a more conservative figure.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, to continue my statement, the Army will be able to take 33,000 draftees, men who are not motivated to enlist, who in many cases are not eligible to enlist, and who will not be eligible to reenlist after completing their 2-year terms, and replace them with 33,000 men who want to be in the Army, who want to be in the Army so much, in fact, that they are willing to sign up for a 3-year term conditional upon their successfully completing the STEP educational program.

Recent newspaper accounts have reported that the Government is giving serious thought to revoking the draft exemption for men who are married but have no children; it is thought that this may be necessary because of the increased manpower needs for the war in Vietnam. Yet we hesitate to let the Army try, by running STEP on an experimental basis, to find some other way in which it can meet its manpower needs without causing the great disruption of families which will be inevitable if we once again start to draft married men. It would seem sensible to follow the Army recommendations of giving special training to volunteers who want to enlist before we embark on a program of drafting married men.

Of course, we cannot know for certain how successful STEP will be; that is why it is only planned for 15,000 men a year, rather than 42,000, which is the number estimated might come under the program. But in view of the great gains to be made, and the unquestionable benefits the Army will receive if anything approaching the hoped for level of suc-

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cess is reached, it is certainly well worth making the experiment.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation of 10 minutes on the pending amendment, control of the time to be equally divided between the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the Senator handling the bill, and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON], who has offered the amendment.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I did not hear how much time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Ten minutes; 5 minutes to a side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays on passage of the bill.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, briefly, in response to the proposal to put into the bill the STEP program, I wish to make the following points: No proposal has been made which has had more extensive consideration by the Appropriations Committee, not only this year but last year. Originally this proposal requested funds under a reprogramming provision. It was turned down by the committee last year, but it was stated that we would fully consider it again this year.

Rather extensive hearings were held by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] last year. We went into it again this year.

With all deference to the program and those who may support it, I do not believe a single one of the members who heard the full proposal and engaged in the full discussion felt we should put the program in the bill. That is more particularly true now because of the increased number of personnel that are going to be brought into the Army.

Personally, I did not think the talent of the Army, both commissioned and noncommissioned, should be used in this training program for a great number of men, even if there were some talent found in that group. I am not discounting the fact that there may be personnel who would ultimately qualify, but we had better start with men who we know have the potential and try to make soldiers of them. We should not spend military money on attempting to train those other men. We should not expend our military talent on a program that is so largely educational.

We believe it would cost more to train the STEP personnel. The point has been made that training for those groups who fail to reach induction requirements, physical or mental, or both, would cost

\$4,164 a year, whereas the actual cost of those who are in the Army is \$3,837. In other words, the training cost is less for the man who has the potential, which has already been measured.

Another point, which is not controlling but important, is that the program would upset the Army training bases which are already established to train men as soldiers. These facilities would be vacated in several places and this educational program would be installed there. I did not like that part of the proposal. Places like Fort Leonard Wood are dedicated solely to the training of Army men in the real arts of warfare. To use a part of those facilities for an educational program did not make sense to me.

One of the stated objectives of the Job Corps in the Office of Economic Opportunity is to improve the young men in order that they may enlist in the Armed Forces. That purpose is stated in the body of the measure. Some progress is being made in that direction. But, as a military matter, we failed to find that it would be feasible to draw on military money and talent for this program. That is particularly true when one considers that the Army has the additional burden of training 235,000 men, which number of men will be brought into the service between now and September 1966.

Mr. President, that completes my remarks.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I believe, in the absence of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] most of the points that were raised by his remarks were discussed in my speech, or extemporaneously. So I shall not take all of the 5 minutes allotted to my time.

I wish to make the point, in response to the Senator from Mississippi, who feels we ought to take the talent we have, talent that is high enough to meet the standards of volunteers. I point out again that we are drafting men with a 21 percentile and then training those people, some of whom do not have the capacity to reach the 31 percentile.

It is a tragic thing that we are not prepared to open the doors and do everything we can for the young man who has the basic innate ability to become a good soldier, and qualify by all the standards of the Army, who was deprived of the opportunity to be educated because of the area of the country he came from, and to say to the man who wants to become a volunteer and defend his country, who has all the qualifications, "No, sir, we are not willing to spend any time on you, to provide you with the basic, technical training you need, but we are going to draft men of 21 percentile."

These are the kind of young men we wish to have in the service, those who wish to serve and wish to make a career out of a military life.

Therefore, I would certainly hope that we would give them the opportunity to serve.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Mississippi yield back his time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time have I left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, with relation to the STEP program, let me say to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL] and I heard Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes last September, and we both felt that such a program should not be adopted and should not be started, that the Army should be kept out of educational and health-giving programs, and so on. The Secretary of the Army came up again in the following January and again we heard his request. We also heard it again when the Senator from Mississippi and I and others were on the committee. At least on all those three occasions—and I am not sure that there was not a fourth—I would say that we unanimously decided that the Army should not enter into this sort of training program.

Personally, I feel strongly about that. I feel extremely strongly about it at the present moment, when the Army has so much more of importance on its mind.

I hope, therefore, that the amendment will be rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has now expired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON].

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY], are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 27, nays 67, as follows:

[No. 236 Leg.]

YEAS—27

Bass	Hartko	Morse
Burdick	Javits	Moss
Church	Kennedy, Mass.	Nelson
Cooper	Kennedy, N.Y.	Neuberger
Douglas	Lausche	Pell
Fulbright	Long, La.	Proxmire
Gore	McGovern	Ribicoff
Gruening	McNamara	Tydings
Hart	Mondale	Williams, N.J.

NAYS—67

Aiken	Brewster	Dirksen
Allott	Byrd, Va.	Dominick
Anderson	Byrd, W. Va.	Eastland
Bartlett	Cannon	Eldender
Bayh	Carlson	Fannin
Bennett	Case	Fong
Bible	Cotton	Harris
Booges	Curtis	Hayden

Hickel	Miller	Simpson
Hill	Monroney	Smathers
Holland	Montoya	Smith
Hruska	Morton	Sparkman
Inouye	Mundt	Stennis
Jackson	Murphy	Symington
Jordan, N.C.	Muskie	Talmadge
Jordan, Idaho	Pastore	Thurmond
Kuchel	Pearson	Tower
Long, Mo.	Proouty	Williams, Del.
Magnuson	Robertson	Yarborough
Mansfield	Russell, S.C.	Young, N. Dak.
McClellan	Russell, Ga.	Young, Ohio
McIntyre	Saltonstall	
Motzoff	Scott	

NOT VOTING—6

Clark	Ervin	McGee
Dodd	McCarthy	Randolph

So Mr. NELSON's amendment (No. 417) was rejected.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT TO LIMIT DEBATE ON BREWSTER AMENDMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on the amendment to be offered by the distinguished Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] there be a time limitation, not to exceed 30 minutes, up to 15 minutes to a side, to be controlled by the distinguished Senator in charge of the bill, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the distinguished Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

MR. MORSE. I object.

MR. STENNIS. Will the Senator from Oregon withhold his objection? The unanimous-consent request applies only to the amendment offered by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER].

MR. MORSE. I misunderstood the request. I thought it was to govern all amendments.

MR. MANSFIELD. No.

MR. MORSE. I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the order is entered.

AMENDMENT NO. 420

MR. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I call up my amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 18, beginning with the word "That" in line 21, strike out all down through page 19, line 2, and insert in lieu thereof:

That none of the funds herein appropriated may be expended in any foreign shipyard for (1) the procurement of any vessel, or (2) for the construction of any major component of the hull or superstructure of any vessel to be constructed or converted with funds herein appropriated.

MR. BREWSTER. Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. It requires that all funds expended for the building of ships under the appropriation bill be spent in the United States. It would effectively prevent the purchase of warships for the U.S. Navy overseas. I believe that the American merchant marine and our Navy have suffered by the gradual deterioration of the shipbuilding industry in the United States. The declaration of policy of the United States was set forth in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. I should like to quote brief-

ly from the declaration of policy, which is now the law of the land. It reads:

It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times; (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency; (c) owned and operated under the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d)—

Listen to this—

composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.

I believe that these are worthy objectives. From the point of view of national defense, there is no question that a large and efficient merchant marine, coupled with a healthy shipbuilding and ship repair industry, can make a major contribution to our national security. Vessels are needed for troop transport: the entire 1st Cavalry Division embarked for Vietnam by ship. They are needed for supply functions as well. Some 600 U.S. ships were required to supply American troops in Korea, and the present situation in southeast Asia has demonstrated the continuing need for such vessels. The shipyards, both naval and private, must also be ready to activate and repair vessels for service in the national defense.

The conclusion of the Harvard Business School study for the Navy Department in 1945 still holds true today:

The controlling factor in the determination of the characteristics of shipping and shipbuilding activities in the United States in peacetime as well as in wartime is the national security.

The value to U.S. commerce of a healthy merchant marine is equally clear. There will be gains in employment, in returns to the American economy, and in reliability if a substantial part of our commerce is carried in U.S. bottoms constructed in the United States. This is particularly important in light of persistent balance-of-payments difficulties. Yet today only 9 percent of our foreign commerce moves in American-flag vessels. Norwegian carriers transport twice as much of the American foreign trade as U.S.-flag ships. Liberia carries three times as much as we do. And even from this poor position, we continue to lose ground.

These concerns become all the more urgent in view of the rapid buildup of the fleets of other nations, most especially of the Soviet Union. The United States ranks only fourth in the world in number of ships afloat, even discounting the disastrous effects of the current maritime strike. The Soviet Union has already surpassed us in number of ships in the active fleet, and may shortly exceed us in total tonnage afloat.

While nations like Japan and Norway are engaged in determined efforts to

build up their fleets, we are falling farther and farther behind. We now rank no higher than 11th among shipbuilding nations of the world. The United States—the leading trading nation of the world—risks becoming low man on the totem pole of international shipping and shipbuilding activities.

We have recently been informed by the Department of Defense that after this appropriation bill passes, it is proposed to buy \$60 million worth of warships for the U.S. Navy from British shipyards.

I feel that this purchase would represent a disaster for the American merchant marine, and I am firmly opposed to such action.

Let me state at the outset, Mr. President, that I appreciate the rationale of the Defense Department in offering such a proposal. This country should purchase certain kinds of military equipment abroad, as a partial offset to the huge amounts that our allies spend on military procurement in the United States.

I recognize—and support—the need for give and take in these transactions. But there are certain areas in which we should not give, and shipbuilding leads that list.

In any military conflict, there is great need for supply shipping. The average American fighting soldier requires nearly 37 pounds a day in supplies, military equipment, and other materiel. During the Korean war, a daily supply of 20,000 tons of dry cargo and 125,000 barrels of petroleum was required. This meant that 600 ships had to be diverted to the military effort.

In Vietnam, there is an urgent need for the immediate reactivation of ships in our mothball fleet. For such emergencies, we must maintain a healthy shipyard industry which can meet this need.

We do not produce a healthy American shipyard industry by purchasing \$60 million of ships in Great Britain.

Already 18 of our yards have gone out of business during the last decade. More yards will probably close down during the coming years—especially if we take away their business and transfer it to British yards. And every yard closed down means that much less security for the United States in the event of an emergency.

The maritime editor of the Baltimore Sun recently pointed out:

If there are more than 15 ships to reactivate at one time (for service in Vietnam) there could also be a problem in the shipyards, which have been faced with a shortage of skills because their men have turned to industries with a more definite future.

The problems created by a short-sighted policy now could be of critical importance in later emergencies.

And I maintain it is not good policy to buy U.S. warships overseas.

But, it has been argued, this is a mere exception to the general policy. This is only a small purchase.

To those who advance that argument, I say: Look to the record. In early 1963,

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the Navy contracted to produce two torpedo boats in Norway.

The Navy described this as "an exception to the general policy," due to "military necessity."

In September 1963, the Navy purchased eight more torpedo boats in Norway, for a total of \$6.3 million.

That same year, three destroyer escorts were purchased with U.S. funds in Portugal.

The record, it seems to me, is not very good. Government programs which have started are not easy to stop.

We should not, in my opinion, purchase ships abroad when they could be built in this country and contribute to a healthy American shipyard industry. And they should most certainly not be purchased abroad if the initial transaction will balloon into even greater future purchases, each more injurious than the last to U.S. shipyards.

I concede that those Defense Department officials responsible for this proposal have the best of intentions. But I strongly urge that we must do everything in our power to halt the decline in our shipbuilding and ship repair industry, for the sake of our national security. A first step in that direction would be to prohibit such naval warship purchases abroad.

I charge that the U.S. merchant marine and our shipbuilding industry is the withered arm of the U.S. defenses.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "The Withered Arm," by Mr. Raymond Moley, published in Newsweek, issue of August 30. It discusses the very points I have made here.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. NEUBERGER in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WITHERED ARM—II

(By Raymond Moley)

Above the din of jet aircraft, the news did not penetrate to the Senate Appropriations Committee that the future of our position in southeast Asia rests on sea transport. Simultaneously with the ominous weakening of Singapore in the defense of the crucial Malacca Strait, the committee canceled a cargo ship aided by the House to the building program which is a vital part of our power to meet critical events in the Far East.

War in Vietnam, like the Korean war, is a maritime operation that rests on our capability of delivering men and equipment across thousands of miles of sea. For Korea we had "a bridge of ships" which is gone today.

In an article recently prepared for publication, Adm. John D. Hayes, USN (retired), points up that in the Korean war, Japan was a base of operations not unlike Britain in the war against Germany. We have no such nearby base today and must depend on the more distant Okinawa, Guam, and Philippines. In Japan there is virulent opposition to our Vietnamese policy and a political situation that is none too stable.

FINISHED WITH ENGINES

At Da Nang, Hayes points out, Marines landed from virtually the same ships that landed their ancestors on Okinawa in 1945 and at Inchon in 1950. The 173d Airborne Brigade was not airlifted from Okinawa to

Saigon. It was transported in aging LSTs, of which only a few now remain.

When the Korean war began, we had 2,868 fairly new and efficient dry-cargo ships. Today there are only 131 under 10 years of age. In the Government reserve there remain, along with the famous old Liberties "finished with engines," a few hundred efficient World War II vessels. The Navy, calling last year for ships for an amphibious exercise, found that about 15 ships of the active merchant fleet could meet requirements of speed and cargo-lifting equipment and, of these, only 121 had an additional required feature in standard cargo rig.

In 1957 the replacement program of the subsidized lines began to take effect. The world's finest ships are among the 98 built at vast expenditure by those companies with the help of the Government's construction subsidy to the shipyards. They have very great speed, which is of the essence in wartime. Where shore facilities are inadequate for unloading, they are self-sufficient. Many ships of the subsidized fleet are already in service to Vietnam. But the building program in the face of developing demands in the Far East has been slowed down by budgetary decisions.

An air transport carries limited cargo, but this is a question of millions of tons. Besides, all aircraft are hungry consumers of fuel, which is transported by sea. There is great tanker tonnage available, but we are deficient in those of "handy" size for shallow ports. Only a few have been built.

THE LENGTHENING REACH

Equipment must go by sea not only to an increasing number of American troops but also to the South Vietnamese Army. Food must go to the population, and bases must be built with material brought by ship. Meanwhile, cargo ships must haul the supplies for Armed Forces elsewhere. There is the lifeline to Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. A number of vessels are committed by law to serve essential trade routes. We ship foreign aid and must also try to continue to carry the 5 percent of our commercial cargoes that go by the U.S. ships—when they are not strikebound.

More than 99 percent of all American overseas transport is by ship.

May we look for help from our maritime friends? The price is rising, for they are busy and also carry for the Russians and Red China. Many of their ships have been thriving in the enemy supply line to the Vietcong. While the power of Britain falters at Singapore, her shipping companies—whining "freedom of the seas"—lengthen the Communist reach toward the free world's British-protected Jugular vein east of Suez, Japan, like Britain and West Germany, builds ships for the Communists, and demands that we return Okinawa—a staging base for the war in Vietnam. It is in that peculiar "one world" of international shipping that we must now shop around to supplement our "fourth arm of defense."

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BREWSTER. I am happy to yield to the senior Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, I highly commend the Senator from Maryland for his amendment and for his argument in support of it. There are two aspects I wish to emphasize in its support.

This is really an additional foreign aid program by some \$7 billion of foreign assistance, including, in round numbers, \$3.5 billion that the Senate voted yesterday afternoon.

The American people need to know, as I argued yesterday afternoon, that the

foreign aid program is much in excess of the amounts in the formal foreign aid bill that the administration sent to Congress. There is no justification for adding to the foreign aid already voted.

My second argument is that the proposal in the bill involves the exportation of American jobs. We had better start thinking about our greatest defensive weapon, which is our own economy. We had better stop weakening that economy. We need to strengthen that segment of the economy which is to be found in the economic potential of the shipyards of this country.

I argue not only for the workers in those yards, but for the managers and owners of the yards and the stockholders who have invested in them, as well.

I am at a complete loss to understand why it should be proposed in the Senate this afternoon to deny to our own workers and stockholders the development of our own shipyards. From the standpoint of our security, that cannot be justified.

I believe the Senator from Maryland is to be congratulated on his farsightedness and foresightedness in the present circumstances.

Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the senior Senator from Oregon.

Mr. TYDINGS. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BREWSTER. I am happy to yield to my colleague from Maryland.

Mr. TYDINGS. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the senior Senator from Oregon and to commend the distinguished senior Senator from Maryland for his amendment. I hope that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi will consider accepting it.

This country has grown great as a maritime nation. Since the Revolutionary War it has grown great by its ability to compete with any and all ships afloat.

However, it is well known that our shipbuilding industry is, to put it mildly, not now in the best of situations. In view of this fact, it does not make sense to permit and encourage the Defense Department to purchase ships and have them built in foreign shipyards, unless we are faced with a dire emergency.

I hope the distinguished Senator from Mississippi will consider the need of this country to maintain a strong shipbuilding industry.

It is important to the future of our country, both for defense and for the economy, that we build our own ships and that we sail them.

I believe that the amendment of the senior Senator from Maryland would be a firm step forward in that direction.

Mr. BREWSTER. I thank my distinguished colleague from Maryland for his eloquent comments and vigorous support.

Madam President, how much time have I remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, this is a very important question. As I see it, the merits of the question are not only as they appear on the surface.

In the beginning I favored the position taken by the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BREWSTER). The subcommittee and the full committee went fully into the entire matter, and I became firmly convinced, after talking with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Defense, that it was a sound position for us not to preclude the buying of a few small ships from the United Kingdom.

The bill provides \$1.5 billion for the construction and conversion of Navy ships plus a carryover of \$400 million more, which will make available, in round figures, almost \$2 billion, for this program.

Having a small number of small ships built in the United Kingdom will not amount to more than \$50 or \$60 million, as now contemplated.

This is the rest of the picture: The United Kingdom has agreed to buy from us almost \$2 billion worth of military aircraft. Great Britain has already made this announcement, and the program is already in effect so far as that country is concerned. With the spare parts that are to follow, the amount could well equal \$3 billion. This has been represented to the committee by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Defense, separately. I have before me the papers with reference to the financing.

I wish the Senator from Oregon were in the Chamber now. He said this was another foreign aid program. I found it to be a hard loan from beginning to end, paying 4.75-percent interest; that it is repayable over a period of 7 years after the last disbursement. The Export-Import Bank has already agreed to the initial part of the loan.

This is a huge item. It represents a marked change in policy by the Government of the United Kingdom.

My first impression was that this was a soft loan and not a good thing, but after going into it fully I became overwhelmingly convinced that it is a sound policy, one that is highly important.

From speaking with the Secretary of Defense I do not doubt that the United States will be well represented in any trading or bargaining when he is the spokesman for our side. The Secretary of Defense has nothing in mind that is a soft policy, or anything of that kind.

The Secretary of Defense has not agreed to buy a single dollar's worth of ships from the United Kingdom. He has agreed that if they are to be built, the United Kingdom will have an opportunity to bid on them. We merely offer them a chance to compete. That is the extent of the agreement.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The inference that might be drawn from the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Maryland is that we shall let the British shipyards build armed freighters or passenger ships which would go into our merchant marine. What type of ship is contemplated?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. At present, the program involves one ocean salvage tug, four yard tugboats, two survey ships, and four ocean minesweepers.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senators for the question and the answer.

I emphasize that this is a far-reaching policy question. It was thoroughly studied and should not be lightly considered or voted on by the Senate.

I asked the Secretary of Defense to furnish us with a letter. I have received that letter, which sets forth his assurances about his approaches to the situation.

I look upon the proposition as a meager token move by us in that direction, and an attempt to take care of the situation—not in balance at all—in which so much is to be purchased from us.

The British are already spending \$500 million a year in cash for the Polaris submarine. That is another illustration of what the British are paying.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, will the Senator repeat the figures on what our expenditures would be in England for the purchase of ships and what the British expenditure would be in the United States for the purchase of airplanes?

Mr. STENNIS. I have that information here in the form of a memorandum. The British have options to order aircraft from us at a total cost of approximately \$2 billion, depending on the amount of the United Kingdom components used. That information is given in detail. The memorandum mentions that spare parts would bring the total to \$3 billion, which is the amount now contemplated.

That would be over a period of years. In other words, they are almost going out of the business of building military planes. This is to be a hard loan, as I have explained, with 4 1/4 percent interest payable within 7 years of termination of procurement and delivery.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, what is the amount of the expenditures that we would be making in Britain in the purchase of these ships?

Mr. STENNIS. The ships involved will run about \$60 million.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, as I understand it, here is about \$1.5 billion in the fund.

Mr. STENNIS. No. To show how small the amount is, there is a carry-over of \$400 million.

Mr. HARTKE. That would be approximately \$2 billion. As I understood, the Senator states that it is expected that only \$50 to \$60 million would be spent overseas. However, could the entire amount not be spent overseas?

Mr. STENNIS. There is no prohibition in the bill against spending it.

However, it could not be done in any good faith whatsoever. They came in and outlined the perimeter of the program. A record was made of that. Of course the "Buy-American" Act is applicable to these funds.

Mr. HARTKE. Why could we not treat England fairly and say, "We will permit \$50 to \$60 million to be spent in England?"

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad that the Senator brought that point up. That has been considered from the standpoint of Germany and Italy. Germany is already paying us in cash more than \$600 million a year for the military supplies that she is receiving from us.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, I believe that in all fairness the Senator would agree that that is, in part, an agreement whereby we are using the manpower overseas to protect them against communism.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, I raised that point. What will we do about Germany, Italy, Japan, and the other countries? There is nothing pending concerning that situation.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, it seems to me that we would open the door for the expenditure of approximately \$2 billion in order to protect about \$50 to \$60 million.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, we would not be opening the door to any situation over which Congress does not exercise absolute control. This appropriation will be considered again next year. The bill comes up every year, as the Senator knows, and we have absolute control over the program.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Madam President, I should say that the situation could be summed up in about one sentence.

I quote from Secretary McNamara's testimony:

Recently in connection with the potential sale of about \$1.5 million of such equipment, a foreign government (England) asked us if we would be willing to allow it to compete for the manufacture of certain military equipment to be bought in this country.

In other words, they would be allowed to compete. There was no agreement. They were to be allowed to offer bids to compete with the industry in this country. Approximately \$60 million for one ocean salvage tug, four yard tugboats, two survey ships, and four ocean minesweepers are involved at the present time. That is all that is on the list now. They bid for those in competition.

We would receive \$1.5 billion or more of business in England. We must remember that they gave up 22,000 jobs in building airplanes in order to have airplanes built in this country.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, I am in favor of helping England. I do not come from a shipbuilding State. So, I am not arguing from any personal standpoint in this regard. The only point I make is that this proposal would open the door for the expenditure of approximately \$2 billion, or, to put it

August 25, 1965

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, August 17, 1965.Hon. CARL HAYDEN,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing in connection with your consideration on Wednesday, August 18, of the proposed amendment to the Defense appropriations bill which would impose an absolute prohibition on the purchase of ships abroad.

During the past 4 years, our Government has taken orders for the sale to foreign governments of over \$9 billion of U.S.-manufactured defense products. These orders will provide over 1 million man-years of employment for U.S. labor and produce almost \$1 billion in additional profits to U.S. industry. Of even greater importance to our Government, the sales will bring \$9 billion payments as a partial offset to our adverse balance of payments. These are unsubsidized sales: They are the result of actions taken personally by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and Secretaries Dillon, Fowler, McNamara, and Vance. They are good for U.S. labor, good for U.S. business, and essential to our Nation.

Recently, Mr. Vance and I participated in negotiations with the British Government which led to firm orders for the sale of almost a billion dollars of U.S.-manufactured equipment and options for the sale of several hundred million more. Because these orders required the approval of the Prime Minister and the British Cabinet and because they resulted in the cancellation of the British TSR-2 fighter aircraft program and the elimination in that one program of over 22,000 jobs in the United Kingdom, the British asked that we agree to buy a small amount of defense products from their industries. I stated we could give no such assurance. They then modified their request and asked that we agree, as a matter of principle, to consider the procurement of certain defense items from British suppliers when such suppliers were fully competitive in terms of quality and costs with U.S. manufacturers. This we agreed to do. To date, under this arrangement, we have procured nothing from British firms, and I do not anticipate that in the future we would procure from the United Kingdom as much as even 10 percent of our sales to them. For us to achieve those sales, however, it is absolutely essential that we have the right to make such procurements when these can be justified on the basis of competitive standards of quality and cost. Such procurements are entirely consistent with the Buy American Act, which requires the Government to procure from U.S. manufacturers except where the national interest will be better served by buying abroad. At present, I am insisting that the Defense Department procure its equipment and services from U.S. manufacturers whenever this can be done at a price not in excess of 50 percent above the price offered by foreign manufacturers—I plan to continue that policy except in those isolated cases where the national interest requires other action. The proposed amendment to the Defense appropriations bill would prohibit such exceptions in the national interest and almost surely would result in the cancellation of British orders from U.S. manufacturers.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, I hold in my hand two letters written by the Secretary of Defense, and I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the RECORD for the information of Senators.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington.Hon. JOHN STENNIS,
Acting Chairman, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I sent to Chairman HAYDEN yesterday setting forth the reasons why a prohibition against purchase of ships from foreign sources would be contrary to the Nation's interest. I very much hope that the committee will agree with the views set forth in the letter and will not seek to incorporate such a prohibition in the appropriations bill.

In accordance with your request, I have also issued instructions that the committee be provided periodically with information on international purchases and sales of defense articles involving the United States. Specifically, we propose to provide every 8 months a report indicating the sales of U.S.-manufactured defense products to foreign governments and the purchases by the Defense Department of defense products from foreign sources. The first report will be for the period ending December 31, 1966, and will be submitted as soon after December 31 as the data is available. Further reports will then be furnished at 8-month intervals.

I hope that this information will prove to be of value to the committee.

Sincerely,

ROBERT S. McNAMARA.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER].

The Chair is in doubt.

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, I ask for a division.

another way, \$2,000 million, in order to protect \$50 to \$60 million.

I do not see why we could not place a limitation on that and provide that we would permit \$75 million to be spent there and protect the balance. It would leave us with approximately \$1,900 million.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, we would be receiving \$2 billion in orders for the items that I have mentioned, and all we would be promising to do would be to allow them to compete with domestic shipyards on these ships.

Mr. HARTKE. We could allow them to compete with reference to \$100 million rather than the \$2 billion.

Mr. STENNIS. No; with all due deference the Senator has that wrong.

Mr. HARTKE. Can the Senator show me where I am wrong?

Mr. STENNIS. We are not promising to buy anything. We are merely going to allow them to compete for \$60 million of business.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, I understand that, but we have approximately \$1.9 billion provided for in the bill. We are saying that approximately \$50 to \$60 million, or less than \$100 million, would be open for competition in shipbuilding in England.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HARTKE. Madam President, I am saying that there is more than \$1,800 million on which the door is left wide open for the Defense Department. I thought that was what the Senator stated a moment ago.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Not the Defense Department. England is going to place those orders in the United States. As I understand, there are firm orders for \$1.5 billion, almost \$2 billion worth of orders, here in the United States.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, the Buy American Act actually now protects the situation to which the Senator is referring because the existing regulations under the Buy American Act requires the Secretary of Defense to apply a 50-percent differential in evaluating any foreign bid. Under this proposal they would be allowed to bid without the differential.

Mr. HARTKE. I understand that.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Madam President, there are firm orders that the British have placed in the United States for almost \$1 billion, and it would later involve several hundred million more dollars. The British Prime Minister and the British Cabinet are involved. They canceled the British TSR-2 fighter which cost them 22,000 jobs in the United Kingdom. The British asked that we agree to buy a certain amount of products from her defense industries. We said we could not do it, but we would allow them to compete. So we agreed to spend about \$60 million for 6 or 8 ships there, but England is spending over \$1 billion in this country. From my standpoint, it is a good trade.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment has expired.

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, I ask

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NOT VOTING—8

Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is not a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were not ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER]. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is paired with the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If present and voting, the Senator from Connecticut would vote "yea," and the Senator from West Virginia would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 20, nays 72, as follows:

[No. 237 Leg. 1]

YEAS—20

Bass	Kennedy, N.Y.	Proxmire
Bayh	Long, La.	Ribicoff
Brewster	McIntyre	Russell, S.C.
Cotton	Montoya	Scott
Gruening	Morse	Smith
Hartke	Nelson	Tydings
Kennedy, Mass.	Neuberger	

NAYS—72

Aiken	Harris	Moss
Allott	Hayden	Mundt
Bartlett	Hickenlooper	Murphy
Bennett	Hill	Muskie
Bible	Holland	Pastore
Boggs	Hruska	Pearson
Burdick	Inouye	Pell
Byrd, Va.	Jackson	Frouty
Byrd, W. Va.	Javits	Robertson
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Russell, Ga.
Carlson	Jordan, Idaho	Saltonstall
Case	Kuchel	Simpson
Church	Lausche	Smathers
Cooper	Long, Mo.	Sparkman
Curtis	Magnuson	Stennis
Dirksen	Mansfield	Symington
Dominick	McClellan	Talmadge
Douglas	McGovern	Thurmond
Eastland	McNamara	Tower
Ellender	Metcalf	Williams, N.J.
Fannin	Miller	Williams, Del.
Fong	Mondale	Yarborough
Fulbright	Monroney	Young, N. Dak.
Gore	Morton	Young, Ohio

this, Tenn. I hope I may make a brief statement and ask some questions in that connection of the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator on that basis.

Mr. GORE. I hope I may do this without being considered provincial. I know that if the planes with which pilots are training are needed in Vietnam, the planes should be in Vietnam. I do not question that. It occurs to me that with a potentially acute need for men trained to fly large transport aircraft, it is profigate to discontinue or deactivate the training of a large number of well-trained competent pilots. It occurred to me that if the C-123's are needed in Vietnam, perhaps those men could be trained in the flying of other planes. I have discussed this matter at length with the distinguished junior Senator from Mississippi, and he has told me that it is not a matter of money. I should like to inquire of the Senator what is possible for use to do under the circumstances.

Mr. STENNIS. Madam President, the two troop carrier groups at Memphis to which the Senator has referred were notified yesterday—at least the announcement has been made, but whether they have been officially notified or not, I do not know—that the squadrons will be deactivated because of the lack of planes, and will not have any further existence. I invite the attention of Senators to the fact that these are two of the finest squadrons of cargo carrier planes that we have in the entire Reserve. They are of exceptional ability. This is the group which volunteered to do the cargo carrying work in the Dominican Republic incident. They flew with ability and distinction. Only last week the Air Force gave them a special award for their achievement.

Now they find themselves deactivated. Last year they had about 23 cargo planes. That number was reduced to 13. For the past month or two they have been training with the same planes; one group was trained one day and the other group the next day. In other words, the planes had to do double duty. These planes are needed in Vietnam, since they are the type of cargo planes—relatively short range—that are being used primarily there. Much of our material in that area is supplied by air. This is a classic illustration of what happens to a fine group of men. There are over 1,300 Reserve personnel in the group. In addition there are about 150 technicians and more than 180 other type personnel.

They were being trained and doing splendid work in the Reserve. Then suddenly they were kicked in the face and let out.

Primarily the cause is the lack of a sufficient number of planes. The planes were needed in Vietnam. There is no margin.

Mr. GORE. Is it not possible that our greatest need could be trained pilots?

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. We have a great investment there. I make that statement entirely aside from my personal viewpoint. These men are trained and ready to go. They performed outstanding service in the Dominican Republic activity. Now they

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are grounded. They are left out of the picture. I asked the question of the Air Force: if they take the planes, what are they going to do with the men? The Air Force said, "They are in the Reserve."

Mr. BASS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I shall be glad to yield in a moment. I wish to cover this point first. There is nothing we can do about putting more money in the bill to meet this situation. That kind of amendment I would be glad to accept. Memphis is one of the better cities in north Mississippi, as the Senator understands. We claim it in part. However, there is nothing that we can do about this situation. This is an executive decision by the Air Force. There is no reason why this group was selected and put out of business. There are a great many good reasons why it should not be put out of business.

Mr. GORE. As the Senator has stated, the decision has not been made for lack of funds.

Mr. STENNIS. No.

Mr. GORE. Funds would be sufficient to continue this activity if the planes were available. Is that correct?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. GORE. Has the Senator a helpful suggestion? I would be glad to offer an amendment, if an amendment were needed. My junior colleague from Tennessee and the Senator from Arkansas, I am sure, would join me. If that is not the case, is there some action that we can take?

Mr. STENNIS. I was very much disturbed by this matter, and yesterday I had prepared in my office, by my staff, the basis of a letter to be sent to the Secretary of Defense, reciting these facts, and what these men had done, and the need for continuing the strength which they represent. We asked him not only to explain the reasons why these two squadrons should be deactivated, but asked him directly to intervene in this case. We also asked if at all consistent with the national welfare, that these two squadrons be reactivated, if not with the same planes, then with planes of equal or better quality.

Mr. GORE. Will the Senator permit me to join him in that letter?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to do so.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Madam President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. STENNIS. I shall be happy to yield to the Senator from Texas, but first I should like to yield to the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Bass], who previously asked me to yield.

Mr. BASS. I appreciate the courtesy of the distinguished committee chairman in yielding to me.

I should like to join my senior colleague from Tennessee in expressing concern over the deactivation of the two outstanding fighter squadrons in Memphis. As the Senator from Mississippi knows, I have personally discussed the question with him in an effort to see if we could not arrive at some solution. Along the lines my colleague has stated, we found that money is not a problem. Adequate funds are available if the Defense Department can find a use for these squadrons in the defense effort.

I express my appreciation to the Senator from Mississippi, the chairman handling the proposed legislation, for the interest which he has shown in the problem. I should also like to join in the effort to insist that the Secretary of Defense personally intervene in this situation, and find whether these meritorious men who have been serving in the Reserves, and who are well-trained personnel, cannot be used in the necessary defense effort. I do not believe the Senator, I, or any of us would ask the Defense Department to reactivate or to continue using these squadrons merely for the purpose of continuing personnel on a payroll or in jobs.

But, as the Senator has pointed out, a squadron that has recently received an award for meritorious service—one that has been well trained and recently used in a very important operation of our Defense Department—could well be used in the present defense effort. I hope the Senator from Mississippi will continue his efforts to assist us in the problem.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator's remarks, and his joining in the effort.

I see the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] is present in the Chamber. Only yesterday at noon time the Senator from Texas mentioned to me that a squadron in his State was involved. That was the first I knew about it. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Texas, for I know he has a deep concern.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for yielding to me.

Of the four squadrons deactivated in the Transport Command, one was at Fort Worth, Tex. It is an extremely efficient unit. I am sure the record will show that its performance has been superior. It has been either excellent or superior at all times. Along with two Memphis units and another, the Fort Worth unit was inactivated.

As I understand, they were not inactivated because of any deficiency in the men themselves or any deficiency of performance. They have demonstrated excellent performance. Their inactivation was the result of a certain type of plane, or something like that. We read that these men are needed. Transportation is needed. Commonsense tells us that when there is a great military buildup in South Vietnam, 8,000 miles away, supply is a larger problem than the people on the ground. It requires more men to supply the fighting men than there are fighting men in Vietnam.

In Korea, which is not as far away as Vietnam, the figures show that during the Korean conflict—and we have studied the question in relation to the GI bill—a majority of those in the service never got into the combat zone—not even the Air Force and the Navy—because the problem of supply was so big when they were so many thousands of miles away. Those trained men who have kept themselves in a combat ready state all those years should not be lightly cast aside to build up some other activity, and to train others for that purpose.

The Government has a big investment in keeping those men ready. They are in Ready Reserve units. Perhaps it

might disprove someone's theory that the Reserves are not ready, because these men are ready in the places named. They have taken training.

I hope that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, in presenting the case to the Department of Defense, as he is so capable of doing, and as he has so ably done in relation to so many other questions, as chairman of the vital subcommittee that he heads, in relation to this vast defense appropriation, will call attention to the fact that there are men trained, ready to serve, ready to go, and that money might be saved by using them rather than starting all over on some other type of project to fill this air transport requirement—because that is what it is—transporting equipment to the places where the equipment is needed.

I thank the distinguished Senator. As he has so generously said, I took this question up with him privately in the open session in an effort to get some adjustments for the use of those fine men at the Fort Worth unit.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for his remarks. I share the concern that he has expressed so well.

I should like to state one additional fact. There are 75 squadrons in the Air Force Reserve. Four of them are being deactivated. Among the four, two are deactivated in Memphis. I repeat: There are two in Memphis deactivated out of a total of four in the Nation. One was removed from Fort Worth. No announcement has yet been made as to location of the fourth one.

Mr. TOWER. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. I commend my distinguished senior colleague from Texas for his very appropriate and cogent comments on the question, and I desire to associate myself with his remarks. At a time when we are facing a really critical point in our sea and air transport, and when we are confronting what is tantamount to a wartime need—a need to anticipate and increase our ability—the important question is not merely whether the equipment is available, but whether trained crews are available. Everyone knows that if the crews are not maintained, men will have to be retrained later on in order to meet the need. The action taken certainly is not a wise move at the present time.

The Department of Defense gave only the briefest of notice to Congress about the announced cutback of four Air Force Reserve troop carrier groups, including the 923d at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Tex.

This will result in a reduction in the number of troop carrier aircraft available at a time when our shortcomings in both sealift and airlift are being pointed out by the long supply line to Vietnam.

The worse loss, however, would be in personnel. Trained troop carrier crews are hard to come by, and have been called up in every crisis since World War II. In the Dominican crisis many of the reserve troop carrier groups were utilized.

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Rather than eliminate these groups and, in effect, end their crew availability, I believe it would be better to simply reduce the number of aircraft used for Reserve training purposes, or assign at least a few newer troop carrier planes to these reserves so the crews can maintain present proficiency. I do not believe this cutback is wise defense strategy.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I appreciate his remarks.

The two groups at Memphis, I understand, have been reduced already from the 31 aircraft authorized to 13. They flew almost 400,000 ton-miles and passenger-miles in support of the recent emergency in the Dominican Republic. For the record, I wish to state that these groups have recently been commended by the Air Force for their outstanding performance.

Mr. BASS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. BASS. I wish again to express my appreciation for the interest the Senator has taken in this problem, and we hope something can be worked out to use these two important units.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for his remarks.

I am going to ask for a review of the entire situation with reference to these Reserve troop carrier units. It is true that the new ones coming out have a heavier carrying capacity, some of them almost twice that of the planes now being sent to Vietnam. It is true they are needed in Vietnam. But the preservation of the skill, ability, and training of these men will unquestionably be endangered, unless something is done.

Mr. BASS. Now is not the time to lose it.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Madam President, so far as the Senator from Mississippi knows, there is no further question now.

I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I prefer the floor in my own right.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the floor.

Mr. MORSE. Madam President, there are several points upon which I wish to comment for the Record before we come to a final vote on the pending proposed legislation.

The junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] has already inserted in the RECORD a statement by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], which is highly critical of the use of the Department of Defense research and development funds for investigations abroad.

On behalf of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am privileged to express to the Senator from Mississippi his deep appreciation and thanks for inserting his prepared speech in the RECORD.

However, some of us on the Foreign Relations Committee feel that the speech deserves more attention than a mere insertion in the RECORD. Therefore, I propose to discuss the speech, and I shall

read most if not all of it in the course of my remarks on what I consider to be a very serious subject, and which, may I say to the Senate, is likewise so considered by other members of the Foreign Relations Committee with whom I have talked today.

May I say to the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTSTALL], the ranking minority member of the Appropriations Committee, whom I see on the floor, that we deeply appreciate the splendid service they have rendered by using their great prestige and influence in causing the Camelot research project to be dropped from this bill.

But dropping it from the bill does not eliminate the inherent dangers of the policy that it represented. Neither does it change the fact that the Defense Department was willing to go along with such a program. This particular research project is not the only one that the Department of Defense has been financing under its research program.

Therefore, some of us who are members of the Committee on Foreign Relations feel that a public hearing on this problem is due. I propose to give that public hearing now.

I endorse the statement of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and wish to elaborate upon it because, as chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, I have seen the great damage that can be done by the uncontrolled research activities of totally incompetent research men operating under the guidance of military minds.

It was quite by chance that Project Camelot was discovered. It was canceled only after the protest of Members of Congress and our very able Ambassador to Chile, Ambassador Dungan.

I predict that other Projects Camelot will be discovered in other countries in Latin America, and perhaps elsewhere.

In fact, only today I have been advised that in probably some 40 countries the United States, to its discredit, is participating in an intervention under the guise of conducting research projects in the field of social sciences.

I am at a loss to understand how bureaucratic minds could have become so twisted, and could have completely suffered such a lapse of commonsense as to propose a series of research projects that are apparently being conducted in a large number of countries in the field of social sciences.

This is an intervention that can only prove to be as damaging to American prestige abroad as a military intervention. It must be stopped. I call upon the President to go even beyond the point he went in connection with Camelot—which I shall discuss momentarily—and make clear to the agencies in the executive branch that this type of U.S. intervention by the United States in the domestic affairs of any foreign country must stop.

If the intervention is not stopped, I predict that the United States will suffer irreparably in many places in the world. We shall prove the vicious propaganda of the Communists, which keeps charg-

ing us with imperialistic policies, to have some basis in fact.

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I have spoken on the floor of the Senate for many years, and have branded that kind of despicable Communist propaganda as fabrication, as it has been, for the most part.

I say to my President that his administration cannot continue this type of intervention under the name of research and not find that many non-Communists around the world suspect that perhaps there is a grain of truth in some of the Communist propaganda.

I predict that more Camelot projects will be discovered in other countries of Latin America and elsewhere.

Only recently, our Ambassador to Brazil was able to stop another of our militarily sponsored research forays, this one into Brazil. Have we no sense whatsoever? How would the American people react if the Brazilian Government were to sponsor a research project in the United States to determine why there have been Negro riots in the South, in Los Angeles, and in Chicago? I might add that Brazil has as much right to advise us in these matters as we have to advise them.

We have no business and no right to be conducting, with military research funds, investigations into the cultural and social activities in Chile, which Camelot involved, or in any other country.

That should be considered off limits for American foreign policy. We are now reaping some of the great losses we are suffering because we have permitted the CIA to develop its police state tactics, methods, and procedures within the framework of the American democracy.

Senators know that a few years ago the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, of which I was chairman, conducted an investigation into the background of the action at the Bay of Pigs. I said at that time on the floor of the Senate, and I say now, that had it not been for the secrecy under which the CIA operates, there never would have been a Bay of Pigs.

This kind of tommyrot that has been carried on by the Defense Establishment under the name of research is an extension of the police state tactics of the CIA. That is why the senior Senator from Oregon, along with other Senators has for years supported the establishment of a congressional watchdog committee over the CIA. It is most regrettable that Congress has never seen fit to give the American people the checking protection that such a watchdog committee would create.

One cannot discuss the research activities in these areas by the Defense Department, or by any other department of the executive branch of our Government, without recognizing that we are thought to be guilty of unjustifiably interfering, by way of intervening in the domestic affairs of a foreign government in which research studies are being conducted.

Thank goodness, the United States had a great Ambassador in Chile. When the protests of the Chilean Govern-

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ment were laid before him, he made personal appeal to Washington that it was in the interests of our country to permit this kind of research project to continue. To his everlasting credit, as I shall show later, when President Johnson became apprised of the facts, he put a stop to the project.

I plead with President Johnson to see to it that someone is appointed to conduct a thorough examination in his own behalf in regard to the research activities of every agency of the executive branch of the Government, and to put a stop to anything that resembles the type of research project the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. Fulbright] pointed out in the speech I shall refer to momentarily.

Military-sponsored research in the field of the social sciences in foreign countries has damaged our already much tarnished image. Only recently there were strikes in Brazil because, it was alleged, two Fulbright scholars were military agents. Our legitimate scholarly work was interfered with because of our own ill-conceived military projects.

I am shocked by the realization that the Department of Defense can, with the greatest of ease, obtain vast sums of money for research in fields of direct concern to our foreign policymakers. I would not be a bit surprised to be told that there may be as many as 40 or 50 military-sponsored research projects in foreign countries, any one of which could seriously damage our relations with those countries if they were to become public.

One of the very competent professional staff members of the Committee on Foreign Relations told me within the last 3 hours that their investigation indicates that I probably would be within the realm of understatement if I were to use the figures which I just used, of 40 to 50 military-sponsored research projects in foreign countries.

The Defense Department has a total budget for research and development of \$6.7 billion, over 1,000 times the \$5.9 million appropriated for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the agency set up to find a way to a peaceful world. Not only that, but also the total cost of the research and intelligence operation of the Department of State is from \$3.5 million to \$4 million, compared with the defense research budget of \$6.7 billion.

The Department of State has the magnificent amount of \$125,000 for all outside research. This is scarcely enough to keep the Department of Defense sponsored social science researchers in coffee and cigarettes.

As best I can make out, the funds saved in the Department under this bill by cancelling the ill-conceived Camelot project is \$1.1 million, nearly 10 times as much as the Department of State spends on outside research in this area.

The Project Camelot budget alone is nearly one third of the total budget for the entire Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State—\$1.1 million versus \$3.5 million.

The Defense Department has budgeted \$23 million for research in behavioral and social sciences, as opposed to \$3.5 million for the research and intelligence operations of the Department of State.

One of the major premises in my argument this afternoon is that the Defense Department has no business intervening under the name of research to investigate matters that falls within the field of foreign policy.

I have been heard to say many times in the past year, as I have protested McNamara's war in Asia, that McNamara has become the Secretary of State to all intents and purposes, at least in that part of the world, if not in most parts of the world.

Again I say to my President, "It is time for you to put the leash on your Secretary of Defense and make it perfectly clear that he ought to stay in his own backyard, if you have to tie him in his own backyard down at the Pentagon and let the Secretary of State operate the State Department."

That policy happens to be consistent with our constitutional system, but when we have a Defense Department engaging in the kind of foreign policy determinations that are involved in these research studies, we cannot support the contention that the Secretary of Defense is not usurping the powers and superseding the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State.

In earlier remarks, I have paid my compliments to the Secretary of State for what I have believed to be his inclination to bow to the will of the Department of Defense. When I say that I have paid my compliments to him, I put the word "compliments" in quotation marks.

I am glad to see that the President of the United States has now, by letter, instructed the Secretary of State "to establish executive procedures which will enable you to assure the propriety of Government-sponsored social science research in the area of foreign policy."

I interpret that letter to mean—and I hope that my interpretation is correct—that the President of the United States has said to the Secretary of State, "You conduct the affairs of this Government in the field of foreign policy as they are related to this matter of Government-sponsored social science research."

If the Secretary of State conducts them, we have better assurance that they will not be conducted in secrecy. If the Secretary of State becomes interested in such a project, we can be sure that the U.S. Ambassador in the country concerned will first find out whether that country wants such a research project carried on within its border. That is the only way we can justify the expenditure of American taxpayer dollars for these research projects.

I wish the President had gone one step further and told the Secretary of State to seek adequate funds for this research. I wish he had gone even a step further and demanded that the Bureau of the Budget exercise its influence to see that the Department of State gets what it needs for foreign policy research and that the Department of Defense is kept out of this business.

I believe, Madam President, that this is a good example of the direction in which this Government tends to move when we pay so much attention to the military aspects of our relations with other nations and so little to the political aspects of our relations.

Camclot is not the only project that should be protested. I have an interesting document in my hand which contains 620 pages. The title is: "Special Warfare Area Handbook for Ethiopia." It is prepared by the Foreign Areas Study Division, Special Operations Research Office, the American University, Washington, D.C., operated under contract with the Department of the Army.

In my judgment, the Department of the Army had no business conducting such a research study. This is but another exhibit showing the tendency on the part of the military minds of this country to interfere in matters that affect American foreign policy—matters that ought to be handled 100 percent under the jurisdiction of the State Department after it has worked out an understanding with the foreign government concerned.

We have an interesting series of studies sponsored by the military minds that have so much to do with American foreign policy. Let me warn the American people to watch out for the concentration of military power in the determination of our foreign policy for civilizations before us have become lost because military minds took over the policies of their governments.

Our Founding Fathers wrote a guarantee into our Constitution that sought to protect the American people from the operation of the military mind in connection with the civilian affairs of this Government.

As I have expressed myself for some years in the Senate, and particularly the past 2 years, I am becoming increasingly concerned about the growing entrenchment of power of the military in determining the civilian policies of our Government. I warn the American people, "Get it out of your head if you think the military cannot take over in a democracy in an hour of crisis. Do not forget that before Hitler, Germany was a democracy, and then the military took over. Do not forget that other democratic civilizations have fallen because the military have been given too much power."

I have before me another interesting research study; 820 pages, entitled "Special Warfare Area Handbook for Japan," prepared by Foreign Areas Study Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, operating under contract with the Department of the Army.

Madam President, this type of research should never have been started.

Special Operations Research Office has been allotted \$2,700,000, \$1.1 million of it for Project Camelot. This compares with some \$3.5 million for the State Department's entire intelligence and research operation.

Let me read the names of some other countries in which this type of study has been made by the American military.

Various handbooks have been approved by SORO as to these countries: Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, Guinea, Panama, Cuba, Germany, and Japan. And there are others.

I read from the transcript of the testimony of the Director of this Army-

sponsored research group as given before the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

Our foreign area studies program, the one which is not funded by the Chief of R. & D., has turned out U.S. Army area handbooks on Brazil, Cyprus, Liberia, and Venezuela during the past year. Associated with these new books has been the updating and modest revision of the previously published handbooks for Egypt, Indonesia, and Korea. Several other books have been reprinted with new prefaces.

This type of research by the military ought to be stopped. The Defense Establishment should be instructed to stay within its own backyard. The State Department owes it to its own jurisdiction and responsibilities to see to it that the authority given to it by the President, in the letter I referred to a few moments ago, is exercised and that the Defense Establishment is stopped from making such a shocking waste of the taxpayers' money.

Of even more importance than stopping the waste is to stop creating the growing ill will in country after country which is created when the people of those countries discover that the United States is interfering in their domestic affairs.

I have engaged in uphill battles to bring reason to bear in the foreign aid program, to eliminate the hundreds of millions of dollars of waste which the Comptroller General of the United States has said is characteristic of our foreign aid—more waste, the Comptroller General testified, than in any other agency of the Government. The excuse given for this type of research expenditure falls under the heading of military assistance. That is the peg on which the Army hangs projects like Camelot. I am for pulling out the peg.

We find on page 10 of the transcript of the House hearings:

Dr. VALLANCE. The Army has a major responsibility within the Defense Establishment in military assistance work. Obviously in Vietnam the Army is deeply involved in the more active stages of dealing with insurgency. The Army thus, in effect is saying in order to do our job better, we need to know the environment in which we are working, what the problems are, how people's expectations may be thwarted by new developments which they are unable to participate in, how these lead to possible hostility toward the home government. The Army says in effect to us then, "Help us to find out more about the problems of breakdown of social order, so that we can be better able to assist in the prevention of breakdown, and in the orderly development of the society."

Dr. ROSENTHAL. All this is hung on the peg of military assistance?

Dr. VALLANCE. The military assistance program is the main source.

Mr. FASCELL. They also have a responsibility, do they not in the use of psychological warfare in the event of combat?

Dr. VALLANCE. That is correct, and in advising the indigenous military in their own programs in that field. Shall I go on? I am nearly to the end of this.

I suggest that we bring it to an end, so far as the Department of the Army is concerned, and deny any funds for this purpose. I am sorry any funds are in the bill for this type of research. I am glad Camelot is out, but I object to any dollars being made available to the De-

partment of Defense for this kind of program.

Why do I say that? This kind of intervention cannot go on in any country without its having an effect on foreign policy in that country. That is the jurisdiction of the State Department, and not the Defense Department.

I call attention to some of the major statements in the great speech of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULDRIGHT], which has been inserted in the Record today. The Senator from Arkansas said in the speech:

I wish to comment briefly on the action taken by the Appropriations Committee concerning research financed by the Department of Defense which touches on foreign policy matters.

Two months ago, it came to light that the special operations research office of American University, an activity which the Army created and supports, was preparing to conduct research in Chile involving delicate questions of our relations with that country. Neither our Ambassador nor the Chilean Government was consulted in advance about the project, and both apparently learned of it from an article in a Chilean newspaper.

(At this point Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I digress from the manuscript of the Senator from Arkansas to say that is the policy of secrecy of the Defense Department, and that is the procedure of secrecy of SORO. That is why the senior Senator from Oregon is warning the American people to watch out for a development of government by secrecy in the United States. That is why I have been heard to say—and I argued it only yesterday afternoon, as I had on my desk plies of reports from the Comptroller General—that the foreign aid program is honeycombed with waste and has been a causative factor for corruption in country after country around the world.

That is why I have been protesting the danger of government by secrecy which is developing. Imagine the Defense Department planning to proceed with a research study in Chile—and in other countries—without the knowledge of the U.S. Ambassador, and without the knowledge of the Government in which country this kind of intervention was planned.

Mr. President, what has happened to our commonsense?

What has happened to our dedication to a system of checks and balances under the Constitution?

What has happened to that safeguard precious to our liberties under which the military mind has no business intervening in civilian affairs?

I am glad that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has brought out the danger of such projects as Camelot.

The Senator from Arkansas continues:

The Chilean project, it developed, was only a small part in a much more ambitious operation called "Project Camelot."

Camelot was described in a fact sheet provided by the Department of the Army as a "basic social science research project on preconditions of internal conflict, and on

effects of indigenous governmental actions—easing, exacerbating or resolving—on those preconditions."

Mr. President, this language seems to me to be jargon. We must watch the Defense Department when it uses jargon, because it has semantic experts who use language to conceal meaning and deceive the American people. This is typical of the military mind.

Continuing to try to read meaning into this jargon, the Senator from Arkansas continues:

This language seems to mean that Camelot was intended as a study of conditions that give rise to revolution and what might be done about them.

This project was but one aspect of this organization's research work for the Army. SORO's work was described by Dr. Vallance, its director, as concerning "mainly the relationships with the peoples of the developing countries and deals with problems of aiding in the orderly process of social change and national development which is of concern to the U.S. Military Establishment. The Army provided \$2,463,000 in the last fiscal year for the operations of this office.

Project Camelot had a budget of \$450,000 for the second half of fiscal year 1965 and \$1.1 million for fiscal 1966. The total projected cost over 3 to 4 years was to be about \$6 million.

I digress to say that money means nothing in the Defense Establishment. It demonstrates time and time again that dollars are but grains of sand on the beachhead of the American economy. The military mind has no appreciation, understanding, or concept of the importance of the dollar. Thus, we have such wasteful projects as these research programs in the field of social science.

Members of the military should be sent back to their social science classes. Members of the military should take a refresher course on the American constitutional system. They need to be reminded of the limitations placed upon their authority and right to intervene in the affairs of civilian government as laid down by our constitutional fathers.

The Senator from Arkansas continues:

The project was canceled in the wake of protests by Members of Congress and by Ambassador Dungan. So far as is known, SORO has not been required to turn back unexpended funds provided for Camelot. I do not know what the Army plans to do with any funds available to it for Camelot but not yet turned over to SORO. I trust we can take it for granted that any such funds will not be turned over to SORO.

Project Camelot gave great offense to the Chilean press and intellectual leaders and, presumably, to the Chilean Government as well. The reason for its offensiveness is obvious to anyone with an iota of commonsense and it seems to me it should also have been obvious to the highly trained "scientists" at American University, as well as to the Army.

The Senator from Arkansas puts quotation marks around the word "scientists"—and appropriately, I believe. Continuing reading:

At a time when United States-Latin American relations are complicated by our intervention in the Dominican Republic, it is not surprising that a project like Camelot should be interpreted as having some perti-

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rence to a possible future U.S. military intervention in Chile in the event of a revolution.

In any case, studies of possible insurgency movements within a country are an exceedingly delicate matter. I can well imagine how Members of the Senate might react if it were announced that Chilean or British or French "scientists"—

In quotation marks, again—

were initiating a study of the conditions that might give rise to racial insurgency in Los Angeles or any other American city and what might be done to prevent it.

Although Camelot has been canceled, other Department of Defense research projects are planned or underway in other Latin American countries, including Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.

I am personally concerned by such projects as Camelot because I believe there lies beneath the jargon of "science" in which these studies abound, a reactionary backward-looking policy opposed to change. Implicit in Camelot, as in the concept of "counterinsurgency," is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to the interests of the United States and that the United States must be prepared to assist, if not actually participate in, measures to repress them. It may be that I am mistaken in this interpretation; if so, I would be greatly reassured to have convincing evidence to that effect.

I digress from the Fulbright manuscript for a moment to say that I do not believe he is mistaken at all. The Defense Department does not believe in social change. The Defense Department and the United States might just as well wake up the fact that there will be great social changes in the century ahead, and I wish to see my Government assist in helping countries in which those social changes will be taking place in keeping with our system of economic and political freedom.

I am convinced that we must prevent the military from carrying out this kind of intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign countries, where social changes may not be to our liking. In my judgment, if we unleash the American military abroad, the effect will be to increase the Communists in the world by the millions, just as our military intervention in southeast Asia today is creating Communists by the hundreds of thousands throughout Asia. That is why the senior Senator from Oregon has been heard to say so often, and will continue to say, short of a declaration of war, that what we ought to be exporting to southeast Asia is bread, not bullets; what we ought to be exporting to southeast Asia is economic freedom, not war. There will be no peace there or elsewhere in the world if we follow the philosophy of the American military mind.

I am glad that the opportunity has presented itself for the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] to make what I predict this afternoon will be recognized as a speech of historic importance for years to come in this Republic.

The Senator from Arkansas requested unanimous consent that there be inserted in the RECORD at that point in his remarks two documents of the Department of the Army, one a fact sheet, and the other a task statement on Project Camelot. The consent which the Senator from Mississippi obtained automatically inserted in

the RECORD the material submitted by the Senator from Arkansas.

The Senator from Arkansas proceeded to say:

Following disclosure of the ambitious plans for Camelot and its cancellation by the Department of Defense, the President, by letter, directed the Secretary of State to establish procedures for clearing all Government-sponsored research involving foreign policy matters. This letter sets a clear and direct policy for all agencies, which should insure that an incident like Project Camelot will not happen again, to the embarrassment of the Nation's foreign policy.

Then the Senator from Arkansas asked unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at that point the President's letter. That consent was automatically given when the Senator from Mississippi courteously asked permission to insert the speech of the Senator from Arkansas and the material he sought to have inserted.

The Senator from Arkansas proceeded to say:

This directive accomplishes the purpose I had in mind in proposing an amendment to the Defense appropriation bill when it was pending before the Senate committee. I understand that the question was discussed at length by the committee and I am pleased that it included language in its report expressing its concern about the need for coordination in keeping with the President's order.

At the close of my remarks, I should like to have printed in the RECORD material on page 46 of the committee's report on this bill with the heading "Research in Foreign Countries," including the quotation from the President's letter. I ask to have that excerpt from the report printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas continued:

This report makes mention of a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense, designed to implement the President's instruction, and I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD following my statement.

The Committee's expression is reassuring and I am hopeful that it will follow up to insure that the Department of Defense is indeed carrying out the letter and the spirit of the President's order for coordination. I can assure the Senate that the Committee on Foreign Relations will have a continuing interest in this problem.

Mr. President, beyond the immediate implications of this incident, broader issues have been raised concerning Government-financed research generally. The Federal Government is now spending some \$15 billion a year on research and development. Over \$8.7 billion is budgeted for Department of Defense research in fiscal 1966.

All too often, it seems that research is used by Government agencies either for prestige and growth purposes, or as a substitute for positive decisionmaking. This is both an unhealthy and a costly trend and I believe the Congress should take a hard look at all Government research activities.

I digress from my reading of the Fulbright manuscript to say to that observation "Amen." He is so unanswerably right. The suggestion he makes should

be quickly implemented by the administration.

Going back to the Fulbright speech, the Senator from Arkansas states:

I note, for example, that nearly \$23 million is budgeted this year for research on behavioral and social sciences by the Defense Department, \$8.3 million of this amount was allocated to the Army and out of this, \$2.7 million was to finance work of the Special Operations Research Office. The House and the Senate committee have reduced the total of this type of research by about \$4 million and I fully support this action. Project Camelot, I fear, is illustrative of the expendable nature of most of this research.

Mr. President, that is my position, too. Millions could be saved for the American taxpayer if we could cut out this boondoggle from this already wasteful bill.

I hope that we shall be able to reduce these wasteful aspects of the military appropriation program.

Going back to the Fulbright speech:

My concern is not limited to this \$23 million budget request but goes to the contribution to our society from the \$15 billion spent for Government research. Is this 15 percent of our Federal budget being spent as wisely and usefully as it should be? This is a basic problem which the Congress has allowed to grow to gargantuan proportions with insufficient consideration and evaluation. The question of sound priorities must be faced someday but I realize that this is not the proper time for such a discussion and that we can deal only with the bill before us. But I am hopeful that before long the appropriate Senate committee, or a special committee, will undertake a thorough study of all our Government's research programs.

MR. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. MORSE. I yield.

MR. HARRIS. I agree with that portion of the statement that he has quoted from the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. I invite his attention to the fact that in the Government Operations Committee, headed by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], a special subcommittee has just been set up on Government research, of which I have the honor to be chairman. It has as its scope the operations of the entire Government research program carried on by all agencies of Government, which is roughly 15 percent of the total Federal budget. Some overall review of that program is definitely long overdue. That is the subject that this subcommittee has as its scope of operation.

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator. I feel that the observations of the Senator from Oklahoma are extremely pertinent.

Later I shall discuss not only with his subcommittee, but also with the McClellan committee, the great concern which exists in the Foreign Relations Committee on the need for coordinating the foreign policy activities of the various Senate committees, including the particular subcommittee the Senator from Oklahoma has mentioned.

We shall discuss that at a later time. There must be developed in the Senate a direct line of jurisdiction in connec-

tion with the activities of every committee which may impinge upon the foreign affairs of this country. He will find me in enthusiastic support of the issue that he raises. That factfinding is needed.

I have mentioned my concern about CIA earlier in my speech. I state for the RECORD that I am still unable to find out exactly what CIA is supposed to do.

I am also concerned that the research facilities of the National Security Agency and other agencies are being duplicated by the Defense Department. I take note of the transcript of the House committee hearing, where Dr. Vallance stated:

Established on July 1, 1964, the Counterinsurgency Information Analysis Center collects, stores, retrieves, and analyzes data pertaining to the human factors involved in insurgency and counterinsurgency situations in specified geographical areas. This Center responds to requirements from appropriate U.S. military and civilian agencies by providing analytical and other advisory services, which supplement those provided by the rest of SORO in its continuing program of cross-cultural research. The Center has developed by this time a strong staff, has initiated a data base of six countries in Latin America, middle east Africa and the Far East, and has responded to a little over 100 inquiries from the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies.

Later, he stated:

In the last half of 1964, a panel on behavioral sciences of the Defense Science Board, after reviewing the Defense Establishment's social science research facilities supporting counterinsurgency, recommended that SORO increasingly orient its research activities to the collection of initial primary data in overseas locations and correspondingly reduce its reliance on library material and other secondary sources. We have endeavored to do this, for we fully agree that more refined data for testing hypotheses and evaluating on-going programs can be obtained if one goes to the contemporary real world source. Our actions in this direction have been reflected in the work of the field offices and in the plans for a number of new studies, including Project Camelot which I will now discuss briefly.

Mr. President, there it is. The Department of Defense is intervening in the foreign policy affairs of a foreign government. That is why we have a great ambassador, such as Ambassador Duncan, vigorously protesting to his Government, when his attention was called to this type of intervention in Chile. We do not like it when we are charged with imperialism, but if we permit this, then the charge of imperialism is proved.

Mr. President, we must insist that all affairs affecting foreign policy be channeled through the American State Department, and that the Defense Establishment be put in its place and told to stay in its place.

I deeply appreciate the fact that the Senator from Arkansas, as chairman of the committee on which I have the honor to serve, prepared this statement of protest, and I only regret that he could not be here to present the speech himself, as he intended to do. But he is indisposed because of a slight illness, and that is why others have presented this material for him today. I sincerely hope that the White House and the State Department will take note that there is great concern among a number of mem-

bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the disclosures that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has brought out.

Mr. President, at a later time I shall discuss what I think are some of the problems that face the Senate in regard to the organization of committee jurisdiction in the Senate in respect to American foreign policy. Suffice it for now to point out that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has made perfectly clear that he plans to protect the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee.

EXHIBIT NO. 1

Recent developments involving the Army's canceled Camelot project have made it clear that the Department of Defense must coordinate its research efforts in foreign countries with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government. On July 12, 1965, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive requiring that all studies in or for the Department of Defense, the conduct of which may affect the relations of the United States with foreign governments, are to be cleared with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. This directive will facilitate the coordination directed by the President in his letter of August 2, 1965, to the Secretary of State in which he said: "Therefore I am asking you to establish effective procedures which will enable you to assure the propriety of Government-sponsored social science research in the area of foreign policy."

Mr. President, I now turn to another concern. I find myself in a very difficult position in determining my vote on this bill. The bill contains many items with which I agree that I find it difficult to vote against it. But it provides \$1,700 million to support what I consider to be an unconstitutional and illegal American war in southeast Asia, making it difficult for me to vote for it. I suppose we can say jocularly, "For once, WAYNE MORSE is on the spot."

But, Mr. President, I have decided to vote for the bill, with the RECORD showing my reasons for so doing.

American boys in South Vietnam did not go there of their own volition. They went there because they were sent by their Government. I fully realize that as long as they are there, they must have every possible bit of protection that can be given to them, although I deplore the fact that, in my opinion, they are sent there to participate in a war that is unwise, unconstitutional, and illegal, in that the President has no constitutional power to make war in the absence of a declaration of war.

It will be said, "You should not vote money to conduct such a war," and there is much merit in that.

But as a liberal, I never overlook human values. When I vote for a bill that includes that \$1,700 million—and I will have a question to ask my good friend from Mississippi momentarily, as to where the \$1,700 million came from, and its justification—I am voting still protesting the war, but I am voting to protect the human values of the American boys who are fighting and dying under governmental orders in that war.

When I balance the two problems that I have just outlined, I feel that I can vote for it in good conscience. I deplore the

action of my Government in conducting this war without living up, as I have been heard to say so many times, to its constitutional obligations and its international treaty obligations. I am voting for it in defense of the men who have been sent, and not in approval of their being sent.

But the RECORD should also show my continued protest of the war itself. The President of the United States should make up his mind as to whether or not he wants to conform to the Constitution, and the Congress should make up its mind as to whether or not it wants to declare war. In the absence of a declaration of war, the President, in my opinion, has no constitutional right to send a single American boy to his death in southeast Asia.

But they are there, and they are dying. They need equipment to protect themselves. The bill proposes the expenditure of \$1.7 billion to give assistance to those boys. I shall vote for it for that reason.

But I shall vote for it also because of its many other features with which I find myself in enthusiastic support; namely, the long overdue pay increase for the military; the provision that was adopted in regard to the so-called 35-65 formula in connection with the building of ships.

Even though I do not approve of the reservation attached to that provision, I believe that if it is wisely followed as the congressional intent by a Secretary of Defense, checked by a President of the United States, what the proponents of the provision—and I was one of them—have in mind will be protected.

I ask the Senator from Mississippi if he can tell us, because I cannot determine it from the committee report, why \$1,700 million was recommended at the time for the prosecution of the Vietnam war, by way of supplying our fighting forces over there. Why \$1,700 million? Why not \$2 billion? Why not \$1 billion? Why not any other figure? I cannot ascertain the reason from the committee report, if it is there. I would appreciate having the Senator call my attention to it if I missed it by oversight. I cannot find a breakdown of the \$1,700 million.

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to respond to the question of the distinguished Senator. It is a very good question, indeed. Earlier this afternoon, in my opening remarks, I first covered the major items that the \$1.7 billion did not include. Then I spoke briefly on the items that it includes. I stated then that we had a breakdown. We insisted on getting a breakdown from the Department of Defense.

Mr. MORSE. May I interrupt to apologize to the Senator from Mississippi. I was trying to handle the education bill, and I missed his opening remarks.

Mr. STENNIS. I know the Senator was detained elsewhere, but I explained then, and shall now explain to him, that we had the breakdown in detail. I shall be glad to show it to him. It is classified, so it could not be included in the report.

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Overall, it pertains to planes, particularly for the engines. Engines are the first units to go into production. The frames come later. The item also provides for helicopters. We are organizing more and more helicopter units. We have had substantial losses of helicopters, as the Senator knows. The bill provides for large supplies of ammunition. I use that term in a broad sense. It includes rockets and cartridges, and the like. Ammunition is being used very rapidly. Bombing has been going on for a good while. Also, repair parts are a major item, due to breakage, wear and tear, and replacements.

About \$150 million is provided for military construction. Most of that is in the Pacific area. Very little is for use at home.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. In broad outline that is the nature of the items. The amount could have been more, because other expenditures are accruing. Of course, funds can be used from the regular appropriations in the bill.

Mr. MORSE. In other words there can be an exercise of the transfer power of the President.

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.

Mr. MORSE. I appreciate the explanation of the Senator from Mississippi. I shall inspect the specific breakdown which he has offered to show to any Senator. The statement of the Senator from Mississippi is somewhat helpful to the Senator from Oregon, but it does not remove my dilemma, for it is a dilemma.

I have decided that I shall vote for the bill because of the human value factor involved and because I believe our soldiers who have been sent there, so long as they are kept there, should be given the funds necessary to provide them with the maximum possible protection that can be given to fighting men.

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will yield, I assure him that this item is almost entirely for the military hardware needed by the men.

Mr. MORSE. That is my understanding.

Mr. STENNIS. In addition, there is some military construction.

Mr. MORSE. I understand. I shall continue to pray that my Government will change its course of action and try to settle this threat to the peace of the world by resort to the Security Council of the United Nations by the filing of a formal resolution on the part of our Government with that body immediately.

The Senate knows that I do not believe that all of the rationalizations that spokesmen for my Government have advanced, such as Secretary Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and Ambassador Goldberg sought to present on television the night before last, can possibly change the undeniable fact that we have not officially and formally filed a resolution before the Security Council. That is the procedure that is called for by the charter. We should proceed to follow it. Until we do, we are making war in violation of the U.N. Charter.

I shall also pray that come January 1, if Congress should mistakenly decide to adjourn sine die while American boys are dying in Vietnam, we shall not be confronted with a situation so serious that a national emergency will have to be declared and that we shall find ourselves in a full-scale war.

I say that for the benefit of the ignorance of the editors of the Washington Star, who published today another of their misleading propaganda editorials, this one entitled "Brighter Day in Vietnam." It reads, in part:

Almost nothing is being heard from the Cassandra who, just a few months ago, were shouting from the housetops that the United States was headed for a major disaster in southeast Asia. They are silent, significantly so. And the reason is not hard to find.

I wish to say to these alleged journalists of the Washington Star that they have only convicted themselves again of being nonreaders. They do not read, except their own rot.

On behalf of those of us who have been protesting this illegal war, and have continued to protest it, I invite them to be in the Senate gallery on Friday, because I intend to speak at some length on Friday in protest of this illegal war, as I have spoken so many times during the period in which they allege there has been a silence.

But I expect that from warmongers; I expect that from editorialists who are unwilling to face up to the fact that we are conducting a war in South Vietnam that a good many of us believe cannot be reconciled with our constitutional system.

Be that as it may, I say to those editors that if they think military victories in battle after battle in South Vietnam spell success for the United States, they could not be more wrong. For months, the senior Senator from Oregon has said that we shall probably win every military engagement in southeast Asia. What makes anyone think that the forces that we are fighting in Asia—which forces are without any equipment, without air-power, and without the great advantage which the American military might possess—can succeed against American military forces? Of course they cannot.

The South Vietnamese could not whip them. So, we had to turn the war into an American war. We had to send over American military power. We will win militarily and lose the war, for what we are going to do is to build up centuries of hatred for Americans, and through Americans, for the white man in Asia.

We and our funky government in Saigon will remain in control of South Vietnam only so long as American troops stay and fight. The editors of the Washington Star and the senior Senator from Oregon and the rest of us will be gone, but the war will go on until we change our policy.

We cannot conduct a white man's war in Asia and eventually win, no matter how many military victories we win, for what we are doing is sowing the seed beds of hatred and vengeance against

the white man, and particularly against the United States.

Look at the map of Asia. Our encloves in South Vietnam, and even in Okinawa, the Philippines, and Taiwan, are no more permanent than were the Dutch in the East Indies, the French in Indochina, or the British in Malaysia. Ours have lasted longer than the others because right now we have the wealth to maintain them against all comers.

But there is not one single significant power in Asia that will aid us in our endeavor to maintain those encloves. In the years and decades to come, there will only be a growing unity in Asia to evict us.

Those of us who have dared to stand up against the tide and plead for peace are referred to by what has almost become an unacceptable word in America. This Christian Nation has almost reached the point of war hysteria in which it is almost subversive to talk about peace.

I have no intention of talking out on the teachings on which I was brought up, for there is no more noble enterprise than seeking to establish a world order of permanent peace. We shall never have a world order of permanent peace with the American military taking over American foreign policy.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial entitled, "Brighter Day In Vietnam," published in the Washington Evening Star of August 25, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD, for I want history to know how ignorant editors can be.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRIGHTER DAY IN VIETNAM

There is no reason to doubt that the dominant feeling in Washington official circles today is one of optimism with respect to the war in Vietnam.

Almost nothing is being heard from the Cassandra who, just a few months ago, were shouting from the housetops that the United States was headed for a major disaster in southeast Asia. They are silent, significantly so. And the reason is not hard to find.

For some weeks now the tide of war has been slowly turning in South Vietnam. There have been no spectacular victories of late for the Vietcong. The monsoon season is approaching its end and the massive Communist assault, which the pessimists feared, has yet to materialize. Finally, last week's smashing victory at Chu Lai by the U.S. Marines has put a new face on the whole business. It had been accepted as gospel that a numerical superiority of 10 to 1 was needed for successful offensive operations against the guerrillas. But the Marines with a superiority of less than 3 to 1, trapped the unit of some 2,000 battle-hardened Vietcong, dug them out of their caves and tunnels, and decisively defeated them in the worst setback of the war for the Communists.

The difference probably was in air power and superior firepower. These are advantages, however, which the enemy cannot take away from us. And the demonstration at Chu Lai of their effectiveness must be caus-

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ing serious second thoughts in Hanoi about the wisdom of any mass attack on United States positions. In this connection a word might be said about the bombings by the B-52's and other aircraft. They have been ridiculed as attacks which accomplished nothing except to devastate jungle areas abandoned by the Vietcong. Yet the evidence is accumulating that these bombings have kept the Vietcong off balance, prevented any large massing of their forces, and have seriously depressed their morale.

It is true, of course, that the course of battle does not necessarily run in one direction all the time. In Vietnam, it may change again. But for the moment there is plenty of reason to believe that cautious optimism is justified, and that mounting pressures and fading victory hopes may serve before too long to bring the Communists to the conference table.

Mr. STENNIS. Before I conclude, I wish to thank the members of the committee who have worked so long and so diligently in the preparation of this bill. The hearings alone, comprising over 2,100 pages of testimony, attest to their hard work.

I believe that the bill before you will provide adequately for our defense needs for the current fiscal year, within the limits which I have described above.

Mr. President, may we have the third reading?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and the third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I want to state for the Record that, with reference to the amendment offered by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], no legislation is contained in this appropriation bill with reference to ships and other equipment.

It is charged that the committee has exceeded its authority. That is in error. No provision concerning that subject is contained in the bill.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SALTONSTALL (when his name was called). On this vote I have a live pair with the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER]. Knowing that if he were here, he would vote "yea," I vote "yea."

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announced that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHEL], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCAR-

THY], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHEL], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] is detained on official business at the White House, and if present and voting, would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 89, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 238 Leg.]

YEAS—89

Aiken	Hayden	Muskie
Allott	Hickenlooper	Nelson
Anderson	Hill	Neuberger
Burkett	Holland	Pastore
Bass	Hruska	Pearson
Bayh	Inouye	Pell
Bennett	Jackson	Prouty
Bible	Javits	Proxmire
Boggs	Jordan, N.C.	Ribicoff
Brewster	Jordan, Idaho	Robertson
Burdick	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell, S.C.
Byrd, Va.	Kennedy, N.Y.	Russell, Oa.
Byrd, W. Va.	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Cannon	Long, Mo.	Scott
Carlson	Long, La.	Simpson
Case	Magnuson	Smathers
Church	McClellan	Smith
Cooper	McGovern	Sparkman
Cotton	McIntyre	Stennis
Curtis	McNamara	Symington
Dominick	Metcalf	Talmadge
Douglas	Miller	Thurmond
Eastland	Mondale	Tower
Fannin	Monroney	Tydings
Fong	Montoya	Williams, N.J.
Gore	Morse	Williams, Del.
Gruening	Morton	Yarborough
Harris	Moss	Young, N. Dak.
Hart	Mundt	Young, Ohio
Hartke	Murphy	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—11

Clark	Ervin	McCarthy
Dirksen	Fulbright	McGee
Dodd	Lausche	Randolph
Ellender	Mansfield	

So the bill (H.R. 9221) was passed.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. So that everyone may understand what has taken place in the byplay here, the majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD] and the minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] were at the White House on official business. We had hoped that they could return to vote. The vote was 89 to nothing. If they had been here the vote would have been 91 to nothing.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and request a conference with the House of Representatives thereon, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. STENNIS, Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia, Mr. HAYDEN, Mr. HILL, Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota, and Mrs. SMITH conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. MANSFIELD subsequently said:

Mr. President, today the Senate approved by a vote of 89 to 0 a \$46,756 million appropriation bill to provide funds for the defense activities of our country. This vitally important measure covered such significant items as provision for, first, military pay, including a raise in that pay; second, ordinary expenses of operation and maintenance and procurement for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, National Guard, and Reserve Forces; third, defense research and development; and fourth, an emergency fund for southeast Asia.

It is a tribute to every Member of this body, but especially to the distinguished and able manager of the bill, the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] and the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the ranking Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that this major measure was treated by this body with such thoroughness, yet with such efficiency and speed. Credit must also be given to the junior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON] and the senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] who so ably presented their amendments, and to the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] who again ably and forcefully stated his position on a number of the provisions in the bill.

I thank and congratulate the Senate on its efficient and thorough treatment of a vital legislative measure.